In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Cydrome Leader wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Cydrome Leader wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Cydrome Leader wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Don Y wrote:

On 8/20/2014 9:21 AM, rickman wrote:
Most of the Kensington devices that I have seen are easily
thwarted (shims, picks, etc. -- e.g., a thin sheet of CARDBOARD,
fragment of a soda can, etc!).

I understand how ALL locks work: locks keep honest people honest.
Period.

All sorts of things are possible. A Kensington lock deters a large
percentage of would be thieves. It is a practical solution that provides
a reasonable amount of protection for a low price and a minimum
inconvenience. If you have a $1500 laptop and want to eliminate any
chance of it being stolen, you can always keep it in your safe deposit
box.

They keep folks who need a "gentle reminder" that "Thou Shalt Not Steal"
from stepping over the line. Most "protection devices" have obvious
flaws or simple exploits. E.g., many homes have sliding doors that
are installed improperly. Your neighbors won't exploit it to enter
your home while you are out -- but, a thief would be glad to do so!

Reasons/motivations for an actual "theft" vary.

When I was in school, picking locks was "just something you did".
No big deal.

A friend used to wander the basements of the school methodically
picking EVERY lock -- leaving the doors, etc. UNlocked when their
occupants arrived in the morning. To him, it was just "practice".

Apparently, one day, he decided to do more than just pick the locks,
no doubt encouraged by how *easy* it was. He was gone a few days
later.


They bragged about how secure the pushbutton locks were at a defense
plant where I worked. I laughed and told them they were useless. They
quoted the number of possible combinations. I shrugged, looked at the
lock, bunched five buttons and opened the door. They demanded to know
who gave me the combination. I smiled and told them, Your cleaning
service. I was told, in no uncertain terms that they were not given the
codes. Then I pointed out that they were not cleaning the face plates
so All I had to do was look at one of the locks to know the code. They
didn't believe me, so I walked down the hall, opening one restricted
area after another. The next day, the chrome bezels were clean and they
looked like they had been waxed. ;-)

simplex type locks are pretty hillarious, expecially when the codes can be
entered in any order, or just by hitting all the right buttons in any
order.


These had to be in the right order, but that was no problem since
each time someone pushed a button, they wiped some crud off their
fingertips. You just punched them in order of the descending crud.

One facility I worked at had some "Department of Defense" certifed keypads
(whatever that means, if anything at all, I was never told a certification
level of spec they adhered to) that were fairly smart.

The keypad had LED displays inside each swith position in the form or a
telephone keypad that could only be read at sitting in a wheelchair height
at which they were mounted. The digits at each button always changed so it
was not possible to watching somebody enter a code and then repeat it as
you could not see what they were keying in. Wear on the keypads was kept
even too, and funny business with figuring out which keys were pressed
last was useless.

Those got disconnected and they went back to keycards for some reason.


What years? Mine was mid '70s, and the DCAS inspector was one of the
group "I showed that flaw, that day.

The cool keypads were in place until maybe 2010? They looked old as heck
but were not all that old when they were installed less than 10 years
before.

That's a couple generations newer that what we had.

I can't imagine they changed much over time. I'm not sure how they were
wired back to a controller. RS-422 maybe?

In sci.electronics.repair wrote:
On Thu, 21 Aug 2014 18:19:18 +0000 (UTC), Cydrome Leader
wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair wrote:
On Wed, 20 Aug 2014 23:51:40 +0000 (UTC), Cydrome Leader
wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Cydrome Leader wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Don Y wrote:

On 8/20/2014 9:21 AM, rickman wrote:
Most of the Kensington devices that I have seen are easily
thwarted (shims, picks, etc. -- e.g., a thin sheet of CARDBOARD,
fragment of a soda can, etc!).

I understand how ALL locks work: locks keep honest people honest.
Period.

All sorts of things are possible. A Kensington lock deters a large
percentage of would be thieves. It is a practical solution that provides
a reasonable amount of protection for a low price and a minimum
inconvenience. If you have a $1500 laptop and want to eliminate any
chance of it being stolen, you can always keep it in your safe deposit
box.

They keep folks who need a "gentle reminder" that "Thou Shalt Not Steal"
from stepping over the line. Most "protection devices" have obvious
flaws or simple exploits. E.g., many homes have sliding doors that
are installed improperly. Your neighbors won't exploit it to enter
your home while you are out -- but, a thief would be glad to do so!

Reasons/motivations for an actual "theft" vary.

When I was in school, picking locks was "just something you did".
No big deal.

A friend used to wander the basements of the school methodically
picking EVERY lock -- leaving the doors, etc. UNlocked when their
occupants arrived in the morning. To him, it was just "practice".

Apparently, one day, he decided to do more than just pick the locks,
no doubt encouraged by how *easy* it was. He was gone a few days
later.


They bragged about how secure the pushbutton locks were at a defense
plant where I worked. I laughed and told them they were useless. They
quoted the number of possible combinations. I shrugged, looked at the
lock, bunched five buttons and opened the door. They demanded to know
who gave me the combination. I smiled and told them, Your cleaning
service. I was told, in no uncertain terms that they were not given the
codes. Then I pointed out that they were not cleaning the face plates
so All I had to do was look at one of the locks to know the code. They
didn't believe me, so I walked down the hall, opening one restricted
area after another. The next day, the chrome bezels were clean and they
looked like they had been waxed. ;-)

simplex type locks are pretty hillarious, expecially when the codes can be
entered in any order, or just by hitting all the right buttons in any
order.


These had to be in the right order, but that was no problem since
each time someone pushed a button, they wiped some crud off their
fingertips. You just punched them in order of the descending crud.

One facility I worked at had some "Department of Defense" certifed keypads
(whatever that means, if anything at all, I was never told a certification
level of spec they adhered to) that were fairly smart.

The keypad had LED displays inside each swith position in the form or a
telephone keypad that could only be read at sitting in a wheelchair height
at which they were mounted. The digits at each button always changed so it
was not possible to watching somebody enter a code and then repeat it as
you could not see what they were keying in. Wear on the keypads was kept
even too, and funny business with figuring out which keys were pressed
last was useless.

Those got disconnected and they went back to keycards for some reason.

Key cards allow security to maintain records of entry into an area.
All of the areas where I work (everywhere but the lobby is "secured")
has card access, both in and out. I swipe the card at least forty
times a day.

They are good for auditing, but are only one part of security in general.
We have doors get just don't close or get propped open, but have no alarms
so nobody investigates. Nothing special here but an office, so who cares.

Every one I've seen has a door-open sensor. Like anything, it depends
on what you do with it how useful it is. At my CPOE, any door that's
propped open will be investigated in minutes (and we don't have any
security clearance issues).

It's good to keep the security people running around. My issue with people
too lazy to even close is door is you know they never lock the screen of
their computers, and have to have laptops and leave them all over the
place. I used to send out "lunch is on me" group emails from unsecure
computers. It was suggested I just start typing letters of resignation to
HR instead.

I did once get a call from corp. security at a telecom site as somehow I
tripped an alarm. I had to wave at a camera and rescan my badge and only
the were they able to clear the alarm. I'm still not sure how they got my
cell phone #.

That's easy. They know who you are by your badge (you did badge in).
Once they know the name, finding a phone number is easy. I'm sure
your phone number is in company records.

In this case, it wasn't a cell number I gave them or the place I was
working for. This was in the era when people wore belts with multiple
pages and cell phones. Anyways, they were awake and did their job
properly.

Cydrome Leader wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Cydrome Leader wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Cydrome Leader wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Cydrome Leader wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Don Y wrote:

On 8/20/2014 9:21 AM, rickman wrote:
Most of the Kensington devices that I have seen are easily
thwarted (shims, picks, etc. -- e.g., a thin sheet of CARDBOARD,
fragment of a soda can, etc!).

I understand how ALL locks work: locks keep honest people honest.
Period.

All sorts of things are possible. A Kensington lock deters a large
percentage of would be thieves. It is a practical solution that provides
a reasonable amount of protection for a low price and a minimum
inconvenience. If you have a $1500 laptop and want to eliminate any
chance of it being stolen, you can always keep it in your safe deposit
box.

They keep folks who need a "gentle reminder" that "Thou Shalt Not Steal"
from stepping over the line. Most "protection devices" have obvious
flaws or simple exploits. E.g., many homes have sliding doors that
are installed improperly. Your neighbors won't exploit it to enter
your home while you are out -- but, a thief would be glad to do so!

Reasons/motivations for an actual "theft" vary.

When I was in school, picking locks was "just something you did".
No big deal.

A friend used to wander the basements of the school methodically
picking EVERY lock -- leaving the doors, etc. UNlocked when their
occupants arrived in the morning. To him, it was just "practice".

Apparently, one day, he decided to do more than just pick the locks,
no doubt encouraged by how *easy* it was. He was gone a few days
later.


They bragged about how secure the pushbutton locks were at a defense
plant where I worked. I laughed and told them they were useless. They
quoted the number of possible combinations. I shrugged, looked at the
lock, bunched five buttons and opened the door. They demanded to know
who gave me the combination. I smiled and told them, Your cleaning
service. I was told, in no uncertain terms that they were not given the
codes. Then I pointed out that they were not cleaning the face plates
so All I had to do was look at one of the locks to know the code. They
didn't believe me, so I walked down the hall, opening one restricted
area after another. The next day, the chrome bezels were clean and they
looked like they had been waxed. ;-)

simplex type locks are pretty hillarious, expecially when the codes can be
entered in any order, or just by hitting all the right buttons in any
order.


These had to be in the right order, but that was no problem since
each time someone pushed a button, they wiped some crud off their
fingertips. You just punched them in order of the descending crud.

One facility I worked at had some "Department of Defense" certifed keypads
(whatever that means, if anything at all, I was never told a certification
level of spec they adhered to) that were fairly smart.

The keypad had LED displays inside each swith position in the form or a
telephone keypad that could only be read at sitting in a wheelchair height
at which they were mounted. The digits at each button always changed so it
was not possible to watching somebody enter a code and then repeat it as
you could not see what they were keying in. Wear on the keypads was kept
even too, and funny business with figuring out which keys were pressed
last was useless.

Those got disconnected and they went back to keycards for some reason.


What years? Mine was mid '70s, and the DCAS inspector was one of the
group "I showed that flaw, that day.

The cool keypads were in place until maybe 2010? They looked old as heck
but were not all that old when they were installed less than 10 years
before.

That's a couple generations newer that what we had.

I can't imagine they changed much over time. I'm not sure how they were
wired back to a controller. RS-422 maybe?


From mechanical, to electronic. Either that or RS-485.


--
Anyone wanting to run for any political office in the US should have to
have a DD214, and a honorable discharge.

In sci.electronics.repair wrote:
On Thu, 21 Aug 2014 18:03:59 +0000 (UTC), Cydrome Leader
wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair wrote:
On Wed, 20 Aug 2014 23:44:21 +0000 (UTC), Cydrome Leader
wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair wrote:
On Wed, 20 Aug 2014 20:10:52 +0000 (UTC), Cydrome Leader
wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair wrote:
On Wed, 20 Aug 2014 15:51:26 +0000 (UTC), Cydrome Leader
wrote:

In sci.electronics.equipment Don Y wrote:
On 8/19/2014 3:46 PM, rickman wrote:
Locks keep honest people honest. As the OP still hasn't indicated
the level of threat that is faced (and attacker's motivation),
all this is just speculation.

You don't understand how a Kensington lock is intended to work. The
point is not to keep a laptop from being taken by brute force. The
intent is to require that enough damage be done to the laptop in the
process that no one will want the unit. Grinding a gaping hole in the

---------------^^^^^^ have you ruled out the *thief*? -- who may be
very happy with a $1500 laptop that has a "gaping hole" in the back
(that he has since covered with duct tape, Bondo, etc.)

side greatly reduces any resale value of a laptop which is already not
much to begin with. Used laptops aren't worth much and one with obvious
case damage is nearly worthless.

Cut the cable by which the "lock-mate" tethers the laptop to
whatever. Remove the remaining piece in the privacy/safety
of your own home. (this assume you have never hacked the locking
device in question -- and have never used a search engine to see
how easy it is!)

Most of the Kensington devices that I have seen are easily
thwarted (shims, picks, etc. -- e.g., a thin sheet of CARDBOARD,
fragment of a soda can, etc!).

I understand how ALL locks work: locks keep honest people honest.
Period.

Going out on a limb here- I doubt the local lockpicking club is the group
breaking into and robbing homes in the OP's area. You don't need a clever
locks on stuff.

Doped up, ****ty, smash and grab then sell for 3% of actual value idiots
are probably at work.

If you make the job hard enough, people either move on or just get angry
and toss stuff around.

The neighbor across the back porch got broken into while I was home once.
They had a modern, thin, poorly installed door that broke down like old
crappy car. Hell, the thing looked like a bathroom door, but with glossy
paint. They never even tried my door, even though it's in a more hidden
area. My only guess is a 1000 year old solid wood door with 800 locks
would have been more work. I also keep enough junk by the door so you
can't even get the space for a good kick, not that that would break it
down anyways, which how most doors around here are compromised anyways.

You have no windows? If there is a window available, no steel door or
vault lock is going to do a damned thing. They're just for the honest
and insurance companies.

The doors have no windows. If you want climb in a window, you better have
a good extension ladder. Again, you can get in, it's just more on a pain
in the ass than breaking into the other units which don't require all the
effort.

Again, locks or doors don't do anything to stop anyone who wants to
get in. It sounds like you're on the second floor, which is likely
why they went elsewhere. The quality of the door, and particularly
the lock, are irrelevant.

the methods they use to break down doors, old and new differs and the one
for old doors is actually pretty clever. None of which even involve
touching the lock, unless you've got a $12 Kwikset lock and nothing more.

Who cares? There are easier ways to get into 99.9% of homes than
busting down a door or picking a lock.

Either way, when you're a harder target, people look elsewhere.

Agreed but a solid front door and lock aren't included. Lights are
likely the best insurance (after buying insurance ...and a gun). A
sign stolen from an alarm company might help, too. ;-)

Take for instance robbing a bank. You walk in, hand over a note, get a
token amount of money, nobody puts up a fight and you walk out. It's
apparently not hard at all once you cross that moral line. Surprise,
there's lots of serial bankrobbers, and it would seem most never get
caught as banks only believe in slow-scan quarter VGA-res security
cameras.

If you think it's that easy, you're nuts. Sure, it's easy, once. It's
easy twice, but pretty soon you're on the TMWL. The FBI doesn't treat
bank robbery kindly, even though the average take is less than $4K.

It doesn't matter what the FBI likes or doesn't like. If you rob a bank,
you walk away with some small amount of money, each and every time. Nobody
resists. Tellers don't jump the counter with baseball bats like at a
liquir store and fight back.

The FBI is all over bank robberies. It ****es 'em off. As it gets to
be more of a "serial" issue, the heat turns up quickly.

Is there enough heat for the government workers to take a break from
taking breaks and actually, lift themselves out of a chair and actually do
some work?

Probably not is my guess.

You might get caught, eventually, and it seems many serial robbers never
get caught.

I doubt that. They will eventually get caught. They aren't the
brightest of the criminal class.

It doesn't require brightness. But unless you leave your ID at the counter
or just made a withdrawl from your own account, you're probably going to
get away with it.

Hell, you can search for bankrobbers by their nicknames:

https://bankrobbers.fbi.gov/

Of course the site is completely broken, search doesn't work and it shows
no robberies in Chicago at all. This website must have cost at least
$10million to get to the point it is at now.

Hi Michael,

On 8/22/2014 6:26 AM, Michael A. Terrell wrote:

rickman wrote:

And they probably thought they had fixed the problem. All you need to
do is to apply something that is not so easily seen but easily removed
by touch. Then check it after the locks have been used, but before they
have been cleaned.

In a defense plant where you had to empty your pockets to get into
the building?

"Dust" from (unused) toilet paper; finely ground salt/sugar from
the cafeteria; thin film of soap (from bathroom sinks); etc.

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Cydrome Leader wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Cydrome Leader wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Cydrome Leader wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Cydrome Leader wrote:

In sci.electronics.repair Michael A. Terrell wrote:

Don Y wrote:

On 8/20/2014 9:21 AM, rickman wrote:
Most of the Kensington devices that I have seen are easily
thwarted (shims, picks, etc. -- e.g., a thin sheet of CARDBOARD,
fragment of a soda can, etc!).

I understand how ALL locks work: locks keep honest people honest.
Period.

All sorts of things are possible. A Kensington lock deters a large
percentage of would be thieves. It is a practical solution that provides
a reasonable amount of protection for a low price and a minimum
inconvenience. If you have a $1500 laptop and want to eliminate any
chance of it being stolen, you can always keep it in your safe deposit
box.

They keep folks who need a "gentle reminder" that "Thou Shalt Not Steal"
from stepping over the line. Most "protection devices" have obvious
flaws or simple exploits. E.g., many homes have sliding doors that
are installed improperly. Your neighbors won't exploit it to enter
your home while you are out -- but, a thief would be glad to do so!

Reasons/motivations for an actual "theft" vary.

When I was in school, picking locks was "just something you did".
No big deal.

A friend used to wander the basements of the school methodically
picking EVERY lock -- leaving the doors, etc. UNlocked when their
occupants arrived in the morning. To him, it was just "practice".

Apparently, one day, he decided to do more than just pick the locks,
no doubt encouraged by how *easy* it was. He was gone a few days
later.


They bragged about how secure the pushbutton locks were at a defense
plant where I worked. I laughed and told them they were useless. They
quoted the number of possible combinations. I shrugged, looked at the
lock, bunched five buttons and opened the door. They demanded to know
who gave me the combination. I smiled and told them, Your cleaning
service. I was told, in no uncertain terms that they were not given the
codes. Then I pointed out that they were not cleaning the face plates
so All I had to do was look at one of the locks to know the code. They
didn't believe me, so I walked down the hall, opening one restricted
area after another. The next day, the chrome bezels were clean and they
looked like they had been waxed. ;-)

simplex type locks are pretty hillarious, expecially when the codes can be
entered in any order, or just by hitting all the right buttons in any
order.


These had to be in the right order, but that was no problem since
each time someone pushed a button, they wiped some crud off their
fingertips. You just punched them in order of the descending crud.

One facility I worked at had some "Department of Defense" certifed keypads
(whatever that means, if anything at all, I was never told a certification
level of spec they adhered to) that were fairly smart.

The keypad had LED displays inside each swith position in the form or a
telephone keypad that could only be read at sitting in a wheelchair height
at which they were mounted. The digits at each button always changed so it
was not possible to watching somebody enter a code and then repeat it as
you could not see what they were keying in. Wear on the keypads was kept
even too, and funny business with figuring out which keys were pressed
last was useless.

Those got disconnected and they went back to keycards for some reason.


What years? Mine was mid '70s, and the DCAS inspector was one of the
group "I showed that flaw, that day.

The cool keypads were in place until maybe 2010? They looked old as heck
but were not all that old when they were installed less than 10 years
before.

That's a couple generations newer that what we had.

I can't imagine they changed much over time. I'm not sure how they were
wired back to a controller. RS-422 maybe?


From mechanical, to electronic. Either that or RS-485.

So the funky keypards are properly called "scramble keypads" or "scrable
pads". Schlage bought somebody that made them and it looks like Hirsch
also makes them too.

On 8/22/2014 9:26 AM, Michael A. Terrell wrote:

rickman wrote:

And they probably thought they had fixed the problem. All you need to
do is to apply something that is not so easily seen but easily removed
by touch. Then check it after the locks have been used, but before they
have been cleaned.


In a defense plant where you had to empty your pockets to get into
the building?

I've worked defense half my career and have never had my pockets
checked. In fact, most of the places I worked I had to open a brief
case, but the women didn't have to open their purses. But the real
problem were the people who had access without supervision... like the
maintenance or cleaning crews. One place I worked responded to the
theft of a PC (back in the early days when they were boat anchors) by
starting to search briefcases, lol. Clearly the PC didn't walk out in a
briefcase.

Theft is easy if you give it a little thought.

--

Rick

On Fri, 22 Aug 2014 11:20:23 -0700, Don Y wrote:

Hi Michael,

On 8/22/2014 6:26 AM, Michael A. Terrell wrote:

rickman wrote:

And they probably thought they had fixed the problem. All you need to
do is to apply something that is not so easily seen but easily removed
by touch. Then check it after the locks have been used, but before they
have been cleaned.

In a defense plant where you had to empty your pockets to get into
the building?

"Dust" from (unused) toilet paper; finely ground salt/sugar from
the cafeteria; thin film of soap (from bathroom sinks); etc.

Donut glaze perhaps.

Security used in diamond mining is interesting.

--sp

Hi Rick,

On 8/22/2014 12:56 PM, rickman wrote:
Theft is easy if you give it a little thought.

+42

But, the important take-away is *security* is HARD -- especially
because most folks don't give it the thought that is required!

I think it takes a different mindset to be able to seek out flaws
and vulnerabilities. For folks who *implicitly* try to "comply/conform"
these sorts of things probably seem "unreal" ("Why would anyone want
to do *that*?") They probably rule out possibilities as "unlikely"
or "impractical" without ever aggressively exploring them!

Hi Spehro,

On 8/22/2014 1:00 PM, Spehro Pefhany wrote:
On Fri, 22 Aug 2014 11:20:23 -0700, Don wrote:

On 8/22/2014 6:26 AM, Michael A. Terrell wrote:

rickman wrote:

And they probably thought they had fixed the problem. All you need to
do is to apply something that is not so easily seen but easily removed
by touch. Then check it after the locks have been used, but before they
have been cleaned.

In a defense plant where you had to empty your pockets to get into
the building?

"Dust" from (unused) toilet paper; finely ground salt/sugar from
the cafeteria; thin film of soap (from bathroom sinks); etc.

Donut glaze perhaps.

Actually, take the *opposite* approach -- wipe the buttons impeccably
clean! Then, count on the oils from the user's fingertips to adhere
talc, graphite dust (pencil shavings), etc. to the buttons that have
been touched. (you wouldn't want to use graphite BEFOREhand as that
would leave the user wondering why his fingertips were grey...)

Security used in diamond mining is interesting.

I found casinos to be the *most* interesting. There, a strained
expectation of "proper/legal behavior" is in place -- yet you know
both sides distrust each other (and themselves!). And, adversaries
have a pretty good idea of the types of mechanisms that are employed
by the host -- so, already have had to "step up their game" beyond
that of simple/brute-force attacks.

Think of it... you have access by The General Public (not just a
set of pre-screened employees -- diamond miners in your example).
You can't realistically SEARCH each person entering/leaving the
premises (at least, not *visibly*!). And, you want folks to feel
WELCOME and WILLING TO LINGER. Couple that with the fact that
casinos are designed to be the main thoroughfare through the
facility:
- want to go to a show? you need to pass through the casino
- want to exit the building? proceed through the casino
- want to get something to eat? casino, again
etc.

"Security used in diamond mining is interesting. "

At at least one company that sorts diamonds, the Women who work there are rewquired to wear locking chastity belts on the job so they cannot steal diamond by putting them you know where. I got a picture actually if you want.

Even if they know the weight of it all before it comes in, and can of course see what comes out, the practice actually makes unnecessary certain invasive searches should a theft occur. Or actually any other reason the team might "Come up light".

"I found casinos to be the *most* interesting. "

There are more cmaeras in a casino than in all of England. I mean each casino. I mean they got like twenty people watching the cameras.

this is not just orm a documentary I saw, I know a dealer. From what he says, don't even try ANYTHING. the dealer is responsible for keeping pilferage down and he is watched because he has the power to favor a player he might know, or otherwise ne in cahoots with. the camera will catch him whether he hinestly misses something in which case after a few of those he is fired, or doing something to screw with the game. In the latter case he is arrested and put in prison. ANY cheating in gambling (from what I'm told) is a big felony in Nevada, even if it only involved one dollar.

In article ,
says...
"I found casinos to be the *most* interesting. "

There are more cmaeras in a casino than in all of England. I mean each casino. I mean they got like twenty people watching the cameras.


England does not worry about that much, they have their general
population on Prozac and what ever else they can push into them
to turn them into docile subservient creatures..

Isn't it wonderful how useful those social health programs
are?

Jamie

Get a recent copy of "Guns And Ammo" magazine and a pair of about size twelve boots. Put the boots on the magazine just outside the door and make a sign that says "Went to go pick up some ammo, back in a few. Don't mess with the pitbulls, they just been wormed".

Maybe not all that helpful but may be. Some things are p[riceless when it comes to this ****. SCARE THEM. That's right, if they geet the idea they will get caught they will pass you be and pick on the next guy.

Know what that means ? Let's put it thins way, a locked door is an invitation. If it is unlocked and someone tried it, they will figure someone is there. They DO NOT want a confrontation, even the ****ing stoooopidest of them don't want that. they could kil or leave witnesses and few of them are ruthles enough to kill. they are not all that bad, they are most likely addicted to sometning. That makes them somewhat ruthless, but they know, in heaven there is no beer. In jail there is no meth.

Too this day I rarely lonck my door. Know why ? First of all there is little chance of people going around checking for unlocked doors and then robbing the place. The LOCKED door tells them you are not home.

If they are running around doing that, and especially maybe know that you do work at the house, that is a predicament I would rather not have really.

but the bottom line here, no matter what other methodsa you apply, do whatever you can to make it difficult to tell when you are there. I know people who turn on the TV when they LEAVE, not when they get home. for just that reason. They, like me, have known alot of thieves. We just have known alot of people so that's how it is. Plus we were bigtime partiers and ****. As a result, even though I was never much of a thief, I understand the mindset.

Another thing is those who are successaful at it (the ones not in ail) have a timeclock in their mind. Every minute they spend in that place greatly increases the risk of getting caught. Any bunch of things could happen.

Bubba could show up. You could get back from the gunstore. you could be sleeping and forgot to lock the door and be a karate expert. Every second count and that's why just slowing them down is so important.

If they want what you got bad enough noting will stop them. They will show up with an acetylene torch and ****. Whatevr it takes. Do not underestimate their balls or their intelligence. And they ain't dumb. Some NEVER get caught.

On 2014-08-22, Michael A. Terrell wrote:

rickman wrote:

And they probably thought they had fixed the problem. All you need to
do is to apply something that is not so easily seen but easily removed
by touch. Then check it after the locks have been used, but before they
have been cleaned.


In a defense plant where you had to empty your pockets to get into
the building?

eg: sugar powder off a stick of gum. (or manufactured from supplies
taken from the coffee machine)

--
umop apisdn


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Jasen Betts wrote:

On 2014-08-22, Michael A. Terrell wrote:

rickman wrote:

And they probably thought they had fixed the problem. All you need to
do is to apply something that is not so easily seen but easily removed
by touch. Then check it after the locks have been used, but before they
have been cleaned.


In a defense plant where you had to empty your pockets to get into
the building?

eg: sugar powder off a stick of gum. (or manufactured from supplies
taken from the coffee machine)


There were no coffee machines on the production floor. No food or snacks
were allowed on the production floor. The rest rooms had liquid soap.
Being seen standing near any of the security doors was enough to have
you hauled into the security office. One of the guards accused me of
stealing a 'GRC106, complete'. That was a half pallet load of equipment
and hardware. None were missing, and the fool had claimed that I
carried out over 600 pounds in my shirt pocket.

--
Anyone wanting to run for any political office in the US should have to
have a DD214, and a honorable discharge.