On Oct 24, 5:07 am, Gunner Asch wrote:
On Wed, 24 Oct 2007 22:39:29 +1300, Jim wrote:
Gunner Asch wrote:

On Wed, 24 Oct 2007 21:17:47 +1300, Jim wrote:

Gunner Asch wrote:

On Tue, 23 Oct 2007 08:11:52 -0700, "Stuart & Kathryn Fields"
wrote:

I'm in amazement "authorities said. Hundreds of homes were lost in the same
communityfours years ago." It seems like there is some flaw in our
education system.
Stu Fields

yet the same group that controls the educational system demands we
rebuild New Orleans at taxpayer expense......

It was a government agency that built the levees. If they're done a
better job in the first place , the need to rebuild wouldn't have
eventuated.

Jim

Might I suggest a good quality roller bearing under your ass if you
are going to try that sort of spin?

So what bearing are you generating your spin upon? Good chance it's defective...

My spin? Your spin. I suggest a good tapered roller bearing.



http://tinyurl.com/354wfe
Army Corps Is Faulted on New Orleans Levees
Panel Says Studies Foresaw Failure, Urges New Scrutiny

By Joby Warrick and Peter Whoriskey
Washington Post Staff Writers
Saturday, March 25, 2006; Page A06

An organization of civil engineers yesterday questioned the soundness of large portions of New
Orleans's levee system, warning that the city's federally designed flood walls were not built to
standards stringent enough to protect a large city.

Yes.



The group faulted the agency responsible for the levees, the Army Corps of Engineers, for adopting
safety standards that were "too close to the margin" to protect human life. It also called for an
urgent reexamination of the entire levee system, saying there are no assurances that the miles of
concrete "I-walls" in New Orleans will hold up against even a moderate hurricane.

Yes. Those walls built in the 1960s as the parts you snipped away
indicated.



The American Society of Civil Engineers said the levees' collapse was predictable and that the Army
Corps of Engineers failed to anticipate their breakdown.

The possiblity of breakdown was well known for years.





The American Society of Civil Engineers said the levees' collapse was predictable and that the Army
Corps of Engineers failed to anticipate their breakdown. (Michel du Cille - The Washington Post)
Coverage of the Storms
A Devastating Season

The Gulf Coast was hit hard by two massive hurricanes in the fall of 2005.

"The ability of any I-wall in New Orleans to withstand . . . is unknown," said the American Society
of Civil Engineers' External Review Panel, which was appointed to oversee the Corps investigation of
the levee system's collapse during Hurricane Katrina.

The civil engineers group also rejected the explanation given by the Corps that the system had
failed because Katrina had unleashed "unforeseeable" physical forces that weakened the flood walls.
In a letter to Lt. Gen. Carl A. Strock, the Corps' commander, the civil engineers cited three
previous Corps studies that predicted precisely the chain of events that caused the city's 17th
Street Canal flood wall to fail. The breach left much of central and downtown New Orleans underwater.

"It appears that this information never triggered an assessment . . . neither at the time of the
design of the 17th Street Canal flood wall, nor following its construction," the letter said.

Corps officials said they had already taken steps to address problems identified in the letter,
starting with an effort to replace miles of I-walls with sturdier structures. But agency officials
insisted the Corps was not solely to blame for weaknesses in the system.

"We have done the best things we could have done. We live here," spokeswoman Susan J. Jackson said.
During four decades of levee-building in New Orleans, Jackson said, the agency frequently found its
hands tied because of restrictions imposed by budgets, by Congress or by local governments that
often failed to meet financial responsibilities to help build and maintain the levees. Jackson
added: "It was a question of who was going to pay, and how much."

The American Society of Civil Engineers panel is one of three independent teams investigating the
failure of the New Orleans levees, and until now it has been the most cautious in its public
criticisms. The other investigating teams quickly endorsed its findings.

"We agree that every single foot of the I-walls is suspect," said Ivor van Heerden, leader of a
Louisiana-appointed team of engineers. "When asked, we have constantly urged anyone returning to New
Orleans to exercise caution, because the system now in place could fail in a Category 2 storm. It
has already failed during a fast-moving Category 3 storm that missed New Orleans by 30 miles."

Two weeks ago, the Corps proposed a new theory for why the 17th Street Canal flood wall collapsed on
Aug. 29, despite never being overtopped by Katrina's floodwaters. Whereas previous investigations
had pointed to weak soils beneath the flood wall, new data suggested a combination of factors:
First, the force of rising floodwaters inside the canal bent the walls outward, creating a small gap
between the walls and their earthen foundation. Then, water surged into the gap, pressing the walls
further until they broke through a layer of weak soil piled up against the sides. In effect, the
levee was sliced in half along its ridge.

Corps officials initially said they had never known a levee to fail this way, and they suggested
that no one could have predicted it. But the civil engineers panel said yesterday that the failure
was foreseen by the Corps' own studies, dating to the mid-1980s. It said the Corps' failure to
anticipate the problem reflected an "overall pattern of engineering judgment inconsistent with that
required for critical structures."

Throughout the design process, the civil engineers said, the Corps consistently failed to make the
kinds of conservative judgments necessary when working in an environment where the soils are
notoriously unstable and the stakes, as measured in human lives, are high.

"These findings present significant implications for current and future safety offered by levees,
flood walls and control structures in New Orleans, and perhaps elsewhere," the letter to Strock said.

The civil engineers panel is due to release a formal report on its findings in two weeks, but its
members chose to send the letter to Strock separately, citing the "gravity and potential impact" of
their findings.

Whoriskey reported from New Orleans.

"the levees that protect New Orleans today date from the 1960s. They
were built in response to earlier floods that had severely damaged the
city, and were considered state of the art at the time. Journalist
John McQuaid says the engineers who designed that system of levees did
so without the benefit of today's advanced technology. "They didn't
really know, since they didn't have computers up and running that
could model storm surges and the like, exactly what level of
protection it afforded, in terms of how likely it was to be
over-topped, but they were pretty proud of it and thought it would
last a long time."

Once they got computers, he says, they did model the effect of a
hurricane, and establish a rating for exactly the strength of storm
the levees could withstand. "It was a fast-moving Category 3 storm.
Anything stronger than that, the levee system could not be guaranteed
to protect the city."

And the levees were no match for Katrina -- which came off the Gulf of
Mexico as a
Two breeches in the Florida Street levee, looking toward the
Mississippi River, are shown Tuesday, Aug. 30, 2005, in New Orleans
after Hurricane Katrina moved through the area.
Two breeches in the Florida Street levee, looking toward the
Mississippi River, are shown Tuesday, Aug. 30, 2005, in New Orleans
after Hurricane Katrina moved through the area.
much stronger, category 5 storm -- one of the most powerful hurricanes
to hit the United States in years. It was heading straight for New
Orleans but veered off at the last minute. The city was spared a
direct hit. But a storm surge in its wake pushed water from Lake
Pontchartrain over the floodwalls and levees, eating at their
foundations until large sections collapsed.

John McQuaid co-authored a series of articles published in 2002 in New
Orleans' main newspaper, The Times-Picayune, which described just that
vulnerability. "This issue is something that every public official
was aware of," he says. "We published our series, which splashed it
all over town, and the state, and most people who lived in New Orleans
were aware that this was a risk. Most people, I think, hoped and
prayed that it was a relatively remote risk. But in part, New Orleans
always had this fatalistic undercurrent to its character from the very
beginning, and so I think some people thought, well, we'll let the
good times roll and we'll deal with it when it happens."

The reporter puts more of the blame on the government agencies and
bureaucracies that evaluate risk and decide how much money to spend to
counter that risk.

But it's not just a question of money, says Neil Grigg, a professor of
civil engineering at Colorado State University. Levees - like roads
and bridges - need constant attention, too. "Once the levee's built
and it's in there, and people forget about it, as they will do, things
happen to make its condition deteriorate." He enumerates some of those
things: animals can burrow into it, weeds and trees can grow on the
slopes, water can weaken it. "It needs a lot of maintenance and a lot
of attention, continuously, if it's going to be something you can rely
on. It's like these other infrastructure problems, it's not something
you can just put ...

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LOL...well I am glad to see you guys are staying on topic....any
suggestions as to what high pressure high temp lubrication that
bearing will use?

Gunner...if you consider the New Orleans effort to be adequate and all
those people should not be living in harm's way, then where do you
suggest the California solution be to relocating all these people in
the fire's way?

Can they come live with you?

Or are you living where you shouldn't be?

TMT