On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 12:30:21 AM UTC-4, George Plimpton wrote:


*THE* battle of Midway, in which the Japanese carriers were destroyed,
occurred as a direct result of Doolittle's attack on the Japanese mainland.

Try again.

The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid. Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on the Japanese military strength.

Dan

wrote in message
...
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 12:30:21 AM UTC-4, George Plimpton
wrote:


*THE* battle of Midway, in which the Japanese carriers were
destroyed,
occurred as a direct result of Doolittle's attack on the Japanese
mainland.

Try again.

The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid.
Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it
contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but
there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on
the Japanese military strength.

Dan
================

http://armedforcesmuseum.com/world-w...roku-yamamoto/
"Yamamoto was agitated as he was hoping for an offensive battle in the
east, which he felt would finish the American fleet. However, Naval
General Staff officers were not willing to take that risk.
On April 18, 1942, Tokyo and the area around it were attacked by the
"Doolittle Raid". As a result, the Naval General Staff gave Yamamoto
permission to implement his Midway Operation. He began to plan a rush
for both Midway and the Aleutians."

-jsw

On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 10:27:15 AM UTC-4, Jim Wilkins wrote:


The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid.
Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it
contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but
there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on
the Japanese military strength.

Dan
================

http://armedforcesmuseum.com/world-w...roku-yamamoto/
"Yamamoto was agitated as he was hoping for an offensive battle in the
east, which he felt would finish the American fleet. However, Naval
General Staff officers were not willing to take that risk.
On April 18, 1942, Tokyo and the area around it were attacked by the
"Doolittle Raid". As a result, the Naval General Staff gave Yamamoto
permission to implement his Midway Operation. He began to plan a rush
for both Midway and the Aleutians."

-jsw

Just as I said. It contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific. Yamamoto was pushing for an offensive battle already. It did not have any bearing on the performance of the Japanese Navy, the ships they had available to deploy, the strategy, the availability of aircraft, the ability to decode Japanese messages, the repairs to the Yorktown.

In short it only influenced the decision to secure the Pacific. It had no affect on the battle.

If the Doolittle Raid was so successful, why was it never repeated? Because from a military standpoint it wasted planes and pilots with almost no damage to the Japanese mainland.

Dan

On 3/31/2015 10:11 AM, wrote:
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 10:27:15 AM UTC-4, Jim Wilkins wrote:


The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid.
Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it
contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but
there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on
the Japanese military strength.

Dan
================

http://armedforcesmuseum.com/world-w...roku-yamamoto/
"Yamamoto was agitated as he was hoping for an offensive battle in the
east, which he felt would finish the American fleet. However, Naval
General Staff officers were not willing to take that risk.
On April 18, 1942, Tokyo and the area around it were attacked by the
"Doolittle Raid". As a result, the Naval General Staff gave Yamamoto
permission to implement his Midway Operation. He began to plan a rush
for both Midway and the Aleutians."

-jsw

Just as I said. It contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific. Yamamoto was pushing for an offensive battle already.

He was *losing* that battle among the strategic planning elite.

The “Doolittle Raid” as it came to be known in honor of its
commander, Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle, was a pivotal moment in
World War II, resulting in strategic implications far beyond the
modest damage it did to the Japanese homeland, according to Dr.
Robert S. Ehlers, an authority on airpower and director of Angelo
State University’s Center for Security Studies.

Eighty aviators, including 13 from Texas, one of whom was born in
nearby Robert Lee, struck a retaliatory blow on a mission that
marked the first time a foreign power had successfully attacked the
island nation. The raid dramatically re-shaped Japanese strategy,
disastrously as it turned out, in the early months of the American
conflict in the Pacific.

“The raid led directly to the Japanese decision to attack Midway,”
said Ehlers, “and the Battle of Midway became the turning point in
the Pacific War, though the fighting would continue for more than
three years.”
[...]
Ehlers explained that the Japanese Army and Navy high commands had
different strategies for defeating the Allies. The army was heavily
engaged in China, had advanced to the borders of India, and wanted
the navy to support an Indian Ocean strategy that would allow the
Japanese to capture Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), an island with major
British naval and air bases at the time. Using Ceylon as a base for
attacks on merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean, the army hoped to
defeat the British force in India, then ultimately link up with the
German Army and defeat the Allies with a unified force.

By contrast, the Japanese Navy wanted to maintain the integrity of
the defensive barrier it had created in the Pacific and to take New
Guinea and at least parts of Australia, along with all the islands
in that region, to keep the Americans from sending reinforcements
there, Ehlers said. Then the navy would go after the remaining
American carriers to ensure Japanese naval mastery and freedom of
action in the Pacific.

“The Doolittle Raid,” said Ehlers, “gave the Japanese Navy what it
wanted, especially since the Emperor weighed in, a very rare thing,
on the Navy’s side in an effort to ensure there wasn’t another
American attack on the Japanese Home Islands. So, the raid set
Japanese strategy in such a way that Midway became the decisive
meeting point, and the Indian Ocean strategy went out the window.”

https://www.angelo.edu/content/news/...red-for-impact


Prediction: you will now stubbornly insist that you are right, and the
academic experts are wrong.

--

Your first duty is to th' country...is to th' flag, and then...and then
th' army,
and then to...and then to god. Flag, Army, God - F.A.G.

Mark Wieber
75th Rangers, 1971-1973

On 3/31/2015 12:11 PM, wrote:
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 10:27:15 AM UTC-4, Jim Wilkins wrote:


The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's
raid. Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At
best it contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific
region , but there was no direct connection. The raid did not have
any effect on the Japanese military strength.

Dan ================

http://armedforcesmuseum.com/world-w...roku-yamamoto/


"Yamamoto was agitated as he was hoping for an offensive battle in the
east, which he felt would finish the American fleet. However,
Naval General Staff officers were not willing to take that risk. On
April 18, 1942, Tokyo and the area around it were attacked by the
"Doolittle Raid". As a result, the Naval General Staff gave
Yamamoto permission to implement his Midway Operation. He began to
plan a rush for both Midway and the Aleutians."

-jsw

Just as I said. It contributed to Japan's decision to secure the
Pacific. Yamamoto was pushing for an offensive battle already. It
did not have any bearing on the performance of the Japanese Navy, the
ships they had available to deploy, the strategy, the availability of
aircraft, the ability to decode Japanese messages, the repairs to the
Yorktown.

In short it only influenced the decision to secure the Pacific. It
had no affect on the battle.

If the Doolittle Raid was so successful, why was it never repeated?
Because from a military standpoint it wasted planes and pilots with
almost no damage to the Japanese mainland.

Dan

The Doolittle raid demonstrated successfully to the Japanese that we
could and would strike at the home islands and that we were still in the
war. The damage was psychological and it changed the way the high
command saw us as a threat.

No need for a repeat, we had made our point.

David

On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 1:54:07 PM UTC-4, Rudy Canoza wrote:



Prediction: you will now stubbornly insist that you are right, and the
academic experts are wrong.


No , but I will point out you only quoted one " academic expert " who happens to be an enthusiastic Texan.

I consider S.E. Morrison a academic expert. He and Doolittle considered the raid a failure.

Dan

wrote in message
...
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 10:27:15 AM UTC-4, Jim Wilkins wrote:


The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid.
Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it
contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but
there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on
the Japanese military strength.

Dan
================

http://armedforcesmuseum.com/world-w...roku-yamamoto/
"Yamamoto was agitated as he was hoping for an offensive battle in
the
east, which he felt would finish the American fleet. However, Naval
General Staff officers were not willing to take that risk.
On April 18, 1942, Tokyo and the area around it were attacked by the
"Doolittle Raid". As a result, the Naval General Staff gave
Yamamoto
permission to implement his Midway Operation. He began to plan a
rush
for both Midway and the Aleutians."

-jsw

Just as I said. It contributed to Japan's decision to secure the
Pacific. Yamamoto was pushing for an offensive battle already. It
did not have any bearing on the performance of the Japanese Navy, the
ships they had available to deploy, the strategy, the availability of
aircraft, the ability to decode Japanese messages, the repairs to the
Yorktown.

In short it only influenced the decision to secure the Pacific. It had
no affect on the battle.

If the Doolittle Raid was so successful, why was it never repeated?
Because from a military standpoint it wasted planes and pilots with
almost no damage to the Japanese mainland.

Dan

===============

As my reference clearly stated, without the Doolittle Raid the Battle
of Midway wouldn't have happened. That's a 100% 'affect'.

Most likely the confrontations near the Solomons would have been
larger and harder for us instead:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Coral_Sea
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_...stern_Solomons
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_...a_Cruz_Islands
We weren't as lucky during those three as at Midway.

The B-25 raid couldn't be repeated because alerted Jap naval forces
instead of fishing boats would have been guarding the ocean
approaches, and we thought we could bomb Japan far more effectively
with B-29s based in China until we could capture an unsinkable Pacific
island to fly from.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Matterhorn

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing...(November_1943)
"With the exception of the surprise raid at Pearl Harbor, no attack
against such a formidable land target had been attempted by carrier
aircraft. As such it was considered a highly dangerous mission for
the aircrews and placed the carriers themselves at risk. Halsey later
said the threat that the Japanese cruiser force at Rabaul posed to his
landings at Bougainville was "the most desperate emergency that
confronted me in my entire term as ComSoPac."

"The success of the [Rabaul] raid began to change the strongly held
belief that carrier-based air forces could not challenge land-based
air forces."

Doolittle's B-25s could attack from a greater and thus safer standoff
range than carrier planes, but couldn't return and land on the ship,
making the raid a one-time trick that depended on surprise.

This is the man who originated the idea in response to FDR's request
to do "something" against Japan to boost morale.
http://www.uss-hornet.org/history/ww...is_S_Low.shtml

-jsw

On 3/31/2015 2:39 PM, wrote:
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 1:54:07 PM UTC-4, Rudy Canoza wrote:



Prediction: you will now stubbornly insist that you are right, and the
academic experts are wrong.


No , but I will point out you only quoted one " academic expert " who happens to be an enthusiastic Texan.

I consider S.E. Morrison a academic expert. He and Doolittle considered the raid a failure.

Doolittle did *not* consider the raid to be a strategic failure, you
liar. He only considered it a "failure" because all the aircraft were
lost, something not in his control when the planes had to launch 170
nautical miles farther from Tokyo than planned.


--

Your first duty is to th' country...is to th' flag, and then...and then
th' army,
and then to...and then to god. Flag, Army, God - F.A.G.

Mark Wieber
75th Rangers, 1971-1973

On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 7:13:34 PM UTC-4, Rudy Canoza wrote:

I consider S.E. Morrison a academic expert. He and Doolittle considered the raid a failure.

Doolittle did *not* consider the raid to be a strategic failure, you
liar. He only considered it a "failure" because all the aircraft were
lost, something not in his control when the planes had to launch 170
nautical miles farther from Tokyo than planned.



Doolittle expected to be courtmarshalled.

From Wiki

The raid caused negligible material damage to Japan, but it succeeded in its goal of raising American morale and casting doubt in Japan on the ability of its military leaders to defend their home islands. It also contributed to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's decision to attack Midway Island in the Central Pacific--an attack that turned into a decisive strategic defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) by the U.S. Navy in the Battle of Midway. Doolittle, who initially believed that loss of all his aircraft would lead to his being court-martialled, received the Medal of Honor and was promoted two steps to Brigadier General.

Dan

wrote in message
...
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 7:13:34 PM UTC-4, Rudy Canoza wrote:

I consider S.E. Morrison a academic expert. He and Doolittle
considered the raid a failure.

Doolittle did *not* consider the raid to be a strategic failure, you
liar. He only considered it a "failure" because all the aircraft
were
lost, something not in his control when the planes had to launch 170
nautical miles farther from Tokyo than planned.



Doolittle expected to be courtmarshalled.

From Wiki

The raid caused negligible material damage to Japan, but it succeeded
in its goal of raising American morale and casting doubt in Japan on
the ability of its military leaders to defend their home islands. It
also contributed to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's decision to attack
Midway Island in the Central Pacific--an attack that turned into a
decisive strategic defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) by the
U.S. Navy in the Battle of Midway. Doolittle, who initially believed
that loss of all his aircraft would lead to his being
court-martialled, received the Medal of Honor and was promoted two
steps to Brigadier General.

Dan
=========================
Your claim was:
"The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid.
Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it
contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but
there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on
the Japanese military strength."

Now you've seen the evidence that Midway WAS a direct result of the
Doolittle raid, and your reference repeats it. I grant you that it
didn't do much physical harm or affect their strength, but it was only
expected to damage their morale and trust in their leaders, which was
important since Japan was still a parliamentary democracy whose
military leaders could and later did lose power, due to the loss of
Saipan.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hideki_Tojo
"His popularity was sky-high in the early years of the war, as
Japanese forces went from one great victory to another. However, after
the Battle of Midway, with the tide of war turning against Japan, Tojo
faced increasing opposition from within the government and military.
To strengthen his position, in February 1944, Tojo assumed the post of
Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff. However, after the
fall of Saipan, he was forced to resign on July 18, 1944."

Doolittle's plan was to coordinate with Chennault to land and refuel
in China, and he felt personally responsible for the failure to do
that although the real causes were encountering the unexpected
Japanese patrol boat ~200 miles before their planned launch, and
perennially poor communication in China.

-jsw

On 3/31/2015 5:14 PM, wrote:
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 7:13:34 PM UTC-4, Rudy Canoza wrote:

I consider S.E. Morrison a academic expert. He and Doolittle considered the raid a failure.

Doolittle did *not* consider the raid to be a strategic failure, you
liar. He only considered it a "failure" because all the aircraft were
lost, something not in his control when the planes had to launch 170
nautical miles farther from Tokyo than planned.



Doolittle expected to be courtmarshalled.

For the loss of the planes - *not* because the raid was a strategic
failure. It was a strategic success - not in doubt.

The raid caused negligible material damage to Japan, but

But it led Japan to abandon there previously preferred goal of invading
India and capturing Ceylon, and instead attack Midway, where they
suffered a huge defeat.


--

Your first duty is to th' country...is to th' flag, and then...and then
th' army,
and then to...and then to god. Flag, Army, God - F.A.G.

Mark Wieber
75th Rangers, 1971-1973

On 3/31/2015 5:54 PM, Jim Wilkins wrote:
wrote in message
...
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 7:13:34 PM UTC-4, Rudy Canoza wrote:

I consider S.E. Morrison a academic expert. He and Doolittle
considered the raid a failure.

Doolittle did *not* consider the raid to be a strategic failure, you
liar. He only considered it a "failure" because all the aircraft
were
lost, something not in his control when the planes had to launch 170
nautical miles farther from Tokyo than planned.



Doolittle expected to be courtmarshalled.

From Wiki

The raid caused negligible material damage to Japan, but it succeeded
in its goal of raising American morale and casting doubt in Japan on
the ability of its military leaders to defend their home islands. It
also contributed to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's decision to attack
Midway Island in the Central Pacific--an attack that turned into a
decisive strategic defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) by the
U.S. Navy in the Battle of Midway. Doolittle, who initially believed
that loss of all his aircraft would lead to his being
court-martialled, received the Medal of Honor and was promoted two
steps to Brigadier General.

Dan
=========================
Your claim was:
"The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid.
Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it
contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but
there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on
the Japanese military strength."

Now you've seen the evidence that Midway WAS a direct result of the
Doolittle raid, and your reference repeats it. I grant you that it
didn't do much physical harm or affect their strength, but it was only
expected to damage their morale and trust in their leaders, which was
important since Japan was still a parliamentary democracy whose
military leaders could and later did lose power, due to the loss of
Saipan.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hideki_Tojo
"His popularity was sky-high in the early years of the war, as
Japanese forces went from one great victory to another. However, after
the Battle of Midway, with the tide of war turning against Japan, Tojo
faced increasing opposition from within the government and military.
To strengthen his position, in February 1944, Tojo assumed the post of
Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff. However, after the
fall of Saipan, he was forced to resign on July 18, 1944."

Doolittle's plan was to coordinate with Chennault to land and refuel
in China, and he felt personally responsible for the failure to do
that although the real causes were encountering the unexpected
Japanese patrol boat ~200 miles before their planned launch, and
perennially poor communication in China.

This seems to be the consensus opinion of historians, but it's not good
enough for danny.


--

Your first duty is to th' country...is to th' flag, and then...and then
th' army,
and then to...and then to god. Flag, Army, God - F.A.G.

Mark Wieber
75th Rangers, 1971-1973

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message
...
wrote in message
...
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 7:13:34 PM UTC-4, Rudy Canoza wrote:

I consider S.E. Morrison a academic expert. He and Doolittle
considered the raid a failure.

Doolittle did *not* consider the raid to be a strategic failure,
you
liar. He only considered it a "failure" because all the aircraft
were
lost, something not in his control when the planes had to launch
170
nautical miles farther from Tokyo than planned.



Doolittle expected to be courtmarshalled.

From Wiki

The raid caused negligible material damage to Japan, but it
succeeded in its goal of raising American morale and casting doubt
in Japan on the ability of its military leaders to defend their home
islands. It also contributed to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's decision
to attack Midway Island in the Central Pacific--an attack that
turned into a decisive strategic defeat of the Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN) by the U.S. Navy in the Battle of Midway. Doolittle, who
initially believed that loss of all his aircraft would lead to his
being court-martialled, received the Medal of Honor and was promoted
two steps to Brigadier General.

Dan
=========================
Your claim was:
"The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid.
Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it
contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but
there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on
the Japanese military strength."

Now you've seen the evidence that Midway WAS a direct result of the
Doolittle raid, and your reference repeats it. I grant you that it
didn't do much physical harm or affect their strength, but it was
only expected to damage their morale and trust in their leaders,
which was important since Japan was still a parliamentary democracy
whose military leaders could and later did lose power, due to the
loss of Saipan.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hideki_Tojo
"His popularity was sky-high in the early years of the war, as
Japanese forces went from one great victory to another. However,
after the Battle of Midway, with the tide of war turning against
Japan, Tojo faced increasing opposition from within the government
and military. To strengthen his position, in February 1944, Tojo
assumed the post of Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General
Staff. However, after the fall of Saipan, he was forced to resign on
July 18, 1944."

Doolittle's plan was to coordinate with Chennault to land and refuel
in China, and he felt personally responsible for the failure to do
that although the real causes were encountering the unexpected
Japanese patrol boat ~200 miles before their planned launch, and
perennially poor communication in China.

-jsw

Here's an alternate assessment of the raid. Notice that the Japanese
vented their rage over being served their own medicine by massacring a
quarter million Chinese civilians along the escape routes of the
Raiders, a greater toll than for the two A-Bombs.
http://fly.historicwings.com/2013/04...oolittle-raid/

-jsw

On 4/1/2015 5:33 AM, Jim Wilkins wrote:
"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message
...
wrote in message
...
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 7:13:34 PM UTC-4, Rudy Canoza wrote:

I consider S.E. Morrison a academic expert. He and Doolittle
considered the raid a failure.

Doolittle did *not* consider the raid to be a strategic failure,
you
liar. He only considered it a "failure" because all the aircraft
were
lost, something not in his control when the planes had to launch
170
nautical miles farther from Tokyo than planned.



Doolittle expected to be courtmarshalled.

From Wiki

The raid caused negligible material damage to Japan, but it
succeeded in its goal of raising American morale and casting doubt
in Japan on the ability of its military leaders to defend their home
islands. It also contributed to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's decision
to attack Midway Island in the Central Pacific--an attack that
turned into a decisive strategic defeat of the Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN) by the U.S. Navy in the Battle of Midway. Doolittle, who
initially believed that loss of all his aircraft would lead to his
being court-martialled, received the Medal of Honor and was promoted
two steps to Brigadier General.

Dan
=========================
Your claim was:
"The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid.
Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it
contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but
there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on
the Japanese military strength."

Now you've seen the evidence that Midway WAS a direct result of the
Doolittle raid, and your reference repeats it. I grant you that it
didn't do much physical harm or affect their strength, but it was
only expected to damage their morale and trust in their leaders,
which was important since Japan was still a parliamentary democracy
whose military leaders could and later did lose power, due to the
loss of Saipan.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hideki_Tojo
"His popularity was sky-high in the early years of the war, as
Japanese forces went from one great victory to another. However,
after the Battle of Midway, with the tide of war turning against
Japan, Tojo faced increasing opposition from within the government
and military. To strengthen his position, in February 1944, Tojo
assumed the post of Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General
Staff. However, after the fall of Saipan, he was forced to resign on
July 18, 1944."

Doolittle's plan was to coordinate with Chennault to land and refuel
in China, and he felt personally responsible for the failure to do
that although the real causes were encountering the unexpected
Japanese patrol boat ~200 miles before their planned launch, and
perennially poor communication in China.

-jsw

Here's an alternate assessment of the raid. Notice that the Japanese
vented their rage over being served their own medicine by massacring a
quarter million Chinese civilians along the escape routes of the
Raiders, a greater toll than for the two A-Bombs.
http://fly.historicwings.com/2013/04...oolittle-raid/

Also at that site:

Common Understanding [what might be called the danny caster
misunderstanding]: In terms of strategic decision making as it related
to the wider war in the Pacific, the Doolittle Raid did not influence
Japanese political or military leaders to alter their plans and courses
of action, except to perhaps reinforce the home islands for better
defense in the event of another American raid.

Actual Fact: The Doolittle Raid and subsequent failure of the IJN
Second Fleet to find, engage and successfully defeat the American
carrier task force had much wider implications. Politically, the
Imperial Japanese Navy was placed in a position of having to engage and
succeed against the Americans in the near term. The public and
political view that if American land-based bombers could attack Tokyo
then Japan was more vulnerable than many had believed was matched by the
Japanese military’s own assessment that such vulnerabilities were not
going to be easily reduced. This created a strong incentive to act
swiftly and boldly. Thus, the ultimate outcome of the Doolittle Raid
turned out to be of extraordinary supreme strategic importance — forced
into stronger action in the wake of the American attack, Admiral
Yamamoto made the key decision to move ahead quickly with a more robust
attack on Midway Island. That decision received broad support, perhaps
in large part justified and enabled by the changed political and
military landscape created by the Doolittle Raid itself.


--

Your first duty is to th' country...is to th' flag, and then...and then
th' army,
and then to...and then to god. Flag, Army, God - F.A.G.

Mark Wieber
75th Rangers, 1971-1973