Kevin wrote:

Swingman wrote:

"Kevin" wrote in message

Swingman wrote:


wrote in message



Expense. A proper armored personel carrier like the Strycker is
much more expensive than a Humvee plus a half dozen body bags.


.... anybody who would believe that is one sick puppy.


.... and anybody who doesn't is in denial.


Go ahead, read the original statement again and then tell me "in denial"
of what?

As I understand the OP, he believes the gov't/military decided it is
cheaper to replace personnel than purchase proper equipment.

Well, he can believe that, but I suspect that the real story is that the
Humvee is the replacement for the Jeep and nobody expected them to need to
be armored anymore than the Jeep was armored. Now it turns out that
they're enough more capable than the Jeep that they're being used in ways
that the designers never expected and it turns out that they _do_ need
armor, but actually getting it in place is not going to be something that
is going overnight.

As I understand your reply, you believe this is the product of a warped
mind, and you do not believe our gov't/military could or would make such
a decision.

While it is conceivable they could or would, it seems unlikely that that is
the case in this instance. "Armor the Humvees" will be a lesson for the
next round of procurement, meanwhile retrofitting armor in any systematic
way is going to take time. First somebody has to decide just how good the
armor should be, then issue RFPs, somebody has to produce a prototype, they
have to test it (and they'll find out either that it's not good enough to
provide adequate protection or that it's too heavy for the running gear and
causes breakdowns or that when they have real soldiers try to field install
it too many problems arise or something else major will be wrong with it)
and so there will be another round or two while they fix the design, then
the manufacturer has to tool up for production then it gets delivered. And
all of this has to be approved by Congress first, which usually means a
year or so of lead time during the budget negotiations. I've been inside
this process (and totally frustrated by the delays over which I had no
control) and it sucks but it's the way it is and so far nobody has been
able to come up with a way to shortcut it that doesn't result in even more
massive waste than the current system.

Somewhere in this thread was mentioned the augmentation seen on Shermans
in WWII, almost as justification for the inadequately prepared Humvees.
That augmentation was needed because then, as now, the higher ups
refused to prepare for the inevitable and sent woefully under-armed and
under-armored tanks against the fearsome 88mm gun and thick armor the
Germans deployed. The Brits called the Sherman the "Tommy-toaster".

Uh, were the "higher ups" _aware_ that the 88mm antiaircraft gun could be
used in a dual role? Did it even _exist_ when the contract for the Sherman
was let? Bear in mind that the Sherman was a _vastly_ better tank than
anything that the Germans took into Poland or France--for that matter the
French Char-B was better than the German tanks during the invasion of
France. Are you suggesting that when it was determined the hard way that
the Sherman was inadequate that production should have been halted while
they waited for a new design? So that instead of fighting the Germans with
crappy tanks our guys would have been fighting them with _no_ tanks? If
not, what _do_ you think should have been done but was not that was
technologically feasible without a ground up redesign? And could that
change have been gotten from concept to field delivery in less time that a
new tank design?

Note by the way, that the US was not the only outfit that found that their
tanks needed more armor--look at some of the German field
expedients--concrete poured over the steel for example.

The Sherman only prevailed by virtue of quantity, not quality. In other
words: our side could afford to fill more body than their side.

Uh, as far as body count goes, consider that unlike the US, the Russians had
the best bloody tank in the whole bloody _world_, and look at _their_
losses. There is more to success on the battlefield than quantity or
superiority of hardware. If that were not the case the Germans would have
hit the Maginot Line and bounced.

Have you never heard the infantry referred to as "Mk I, Mod I Bullet
Catchers"?

Ergo, I maintain you are in denial.

I maintain that you are ignorant of the realities of engineering design,
production leadtimes, and military procurement.

Note that the Sherman lesson _was_ learned--I've seen no complaints about
the adequacy of the armor on the Abrams. And the Humvee lesson will be
learned too.

--
--John
Reply to jclarke at ae tee tee global dot net
(was jclarke at eye bee em dot net)