On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 1:05:11 PM UTC-5, wrote:
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 07:20:19 -0800 (PST), trader_4
wrote:

On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 2:51:24 AM UTC-5, wrote:
On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote:

On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote:
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html


At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes.

When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over.
Capitalism at it's best today.

There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem.

That's a good one two. And it's not really a software problem, it's
a DESIGN problem. The programmers didn't make a mistake, the program
does what they were told to make it do. If you bought a TV that didn't
work, that you could not use because of a "software problem",
would you say there was nothing wrong with the TV?



It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are
writing the bugware.

Totally wrong. There is ZERO evidence that I have seen, that this was
a problem created by the programmers. The program did what it was
designed to do.

So I guess you have the specs the programmers were working with.
Please give us a link so we can all see.

If you followed this at all, it's been very clear that Boeing, FAA and
all involved have made it clear that it was a DESIGN issue, not a coding
problem, not a programmer's error. The programmers did not come up with
MCAS, aeronautical engineers did. The programmers did not decide that it
should rely on just one AOA sensor. The programmers did not decide how
much trim authority the MCAS add-on should apply, in what increments,
what max amount. They didn't decide what indicators should be in the
cockpit and whether they should be standard equipment or a $10K extra
option. And they didn't decide to increase the authority MCAS had after
flight testing and to not inform the FAA that they had increased the
amount of trim that MCAS could put on by a factor of three.








Some programmer decided when MCAS was supposed to be operating how it
was monitored.

BS. Programmers don't make those decisions, aeronautical engineers,
test pilots, system designers do. They create the system, describe
how it's to operate, what the parameters are, then software writers
code to it.




My bet, they just gave them broad parameters of what
sensors were available and what actuators they had to use.

That's incredibly silly. Programmers writing code don't understand
how the plane flies or what is or isn't required.



They also
decided to only use one AOA sensor when two were available and not to
alert the pilot when they did not agree.

IDK what your experience with what programmers do has been. In my
experience, in the logical world, those decisions are made by engineers
with experience in the actual underlying system, not programmers.
They lay out what the system is, what elements it uses, what it has to
control, how much authority it has, how it operates. The software coders
then implement that. The FAA also checks the system and approves it.




The latter actually being the fatal flaw.

That's beyond silly too. Programmers don't decide what indicators or
warning lights go into the cockpit. Aeronautical engineers and system
designers determine that. And the planes had a AOA disagree light OPTION,
if airlines wanted to pay for it.
And no, the software writers didn't decide it should be a $10K option
either. Boeing also knew a year before the crash, that even if an airline
ordered that option, it did not work! That was the one and only error
that is likely attributable to the software writers. But it's not the
only error, someone failed again at system validation, making sure it
actually worked. And Boeing management, not the programmers, decided to
keep secret the fact that if you ordered the disagree light as an option,
it did not work secret instead of alerting operators.
They planned on fixing it one day with a software update. That date
never came. There's also no evidence that a working disagree light
would have made any difference, the pilots didn't even know MCAS was
there, much less how it operated.


My guess is the programmers
don't know **** about airplanes, they just write video game type
software and do not take into account dealing with hardware failures.

Yet you think they decide what indicators go into the cockpit, what
sensors are used, what authority over the aircraft systems have, etc.
Go figure.







As for my TV. If the Netflix function takes a **** and everything else
works fine, I would blame the software, not the hardware. Maybe I just
have more experience in this arena tho.

Nice try at moving the goal posts. The issue wasn't whether it was
hardware or software that was the problem with the Max. The issue was
you stated there was nothing wrong with the airplane, only the software.
So, again, if part of your TV doesn't work, if software can cause it
to catch fire, burn down the house and kill people, would you say there
is "nothing wrong with the TV"?








BTW a number of pilots have said if you know how to turn off the MCAS
(put in a little flap), you just land the plane and everyone makes
their connection.

Not any responsible pilots that understand the problem. The pilots in
the Ethiopian crash did exactly that. The co-pilots last words were
that he could not trim the plane manually. Also, "put in a little flap"
was NOT the procedure that Boeing told pilots to use to recover. And
that was AFTER the first crash, after they had more than a week to think
about it. And it surely was not the programmers that issued that
directive either.


The pilot told the co-pilot to stfu too. He was too arrogant to save
his own life.

Cite for that please. Not that it has anything to do with the issue though.
The simple fact is that the co-pilot of the Ethiopian crash correctly
identified the problem and followed the exact procedure that Boeing put out
after the Lion Air crash. It didn't work, because it was impossible to
move the mechanical trim wheels. Which is a problem that Boeing has known
about on all 737s since the 60s. In fact, they used to disclose that in
the manuals and outline a procedure that involves putting the plane into
a dive to relieve forces enough so that the wheel can be turned. Later
they removed that from subsequent manuals and it disappeared. It wouldn't
have mattered in the Ethiopian crahs, the plane did not have sufficient altitude.




Maybe if the co-pilot was more than a recently graduated student the
pilot would have paid more attention to him.

ROFL

Another good one, you're on a roll recently. Blame the co-pilot who had
it correctly identified and did exactly what Boeing said to do. And it's
BS, because the pilot didn't do anything to stop the co-pilot,just more
Fretwell fiction.