On Sun, 13 Jan 2013 08:40:36 -0600, Bill Gill
wrote:

On 1/12/2013 4:05 PM, Leif Neland wrote:
Would it be possible to make a device, which could be carried in a
suitcase, which would destroy/disable a computerized voting machine?

It might kill a few mobile phones too, but that would be a small price
to pay to defend democracy.

Some politicans in my country wants to jeopardize the trust the peoples
trust in our paper ballot system, which everyone can understand, and is
very, if not impossibe to cheat, and replace it with electronic voting
machines.

Even if almost all IT-professionals complain that you can't have both
secret and verifyable e-elections, they still insist on having trials at
the next municipal elections.

The only IT-professionals which are positive, are the companys which
think they can earn hundreds of millions on trying to implement the
system, it seems...

Well, Here in Oklahoma USA we have a double acting system. We vote
with a paper ballot and it is counted electronically. That way we
have a paper trail if there is any doubt.

Bill Gill
Even those are suceptible to manipulation. Some examples from recent
elections:

If a voter failed to indicate a choice in a particular race, a poll
worker would mark the ballot (for the candidate the poll worker
preferred, of course).

Some voters didn't understand the process and would vote for their
choice in the main section of the ballot, and also write in the
candidate's name in the write-in section. Those ballots were not
counted, even though courts have ruled that if there is a clear
indication of an intent to vote for a particular candidate, the ballot
is valid.

In a close race a recount was mandatory. The process would be to run
the ballots from precincts chosen at random through the counter again,
verifying the results matched. If a limited number (5%?) produced no
mismatches, it would be assumed the initial count was correct. The
preliminary recount was scheduled for 10:00AM. The election workers
were there at 7:00AM, running blocks of ballots through the counters
and identifying precincts that matched. Those were distributed at
random, then tagged so the workers could pull known good precincts for
the official recount.

PlainBill