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Robert Green Robert Green is offline
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Default Interesting story about home automobile gasoline filling stations in residential property

"Vic Smith" wrote in message
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On Thu, 15 Dec 2011 15:39:25 -0500, willshak
wrote:


Apparently, god didn't like American torpedo bombers.


Didn't much care for American torpedoes either.
Don't remember the details now, but way too many duds.
Read that in S.E. Morrison extracts and elsewhere.\


Quite true. One of the more realistic sub sims that I've played even
accounted for the large percentage of duds that mostly Pacific sub
commanders had to put up with early in the war. The worst thing you could
hear on the hydrophone after letting loose a fish or two was the horrible
dull bell-like clang of a dud torpedo hitting the hull of an enemy ship and
failing to explode. In many of those cases the clang was soon followed by a
torrent of depth charges which didn't have much of dud problem at all and
sank a number of US subs because of the duds. Part of the problem is that
commanders of the sunken subs usually didn't have time to report the duds -
they were too busy to try to stay alive and that helped mask the problem for
a while.

http://www.ww2pacific.com/torpedo.html

Running depth. (a.) Warheads were heavier than test heads. The wartime
torpedo ran with a head down trim. The shore establishment eventually
acknowledged a four foot error in running depths. Fleet tests in Australia
found an 11 foot depth error. It was not until Aug'42 that a compromise of
10' was agreed and a trim repair kit was issued to the fleet later in that
year.

Running depth. (b.) The depth sensor was designed for a slower running
torpedo. The pressure gradient over the torpedo surface at higher speeds
gave the wrong feedback. The sensor was later relocated to a neutral
position.

The magnetic exploder was designed in the northern latitudes and did not
work as well at the equator. The British and Germans had already disabled
their magnetic exploders before the USN ordered theirs disabled 24June43.
ComSubSWPac had participated in the development of the magnetic exploder,
knew the principle was sound, and resisted disablement until Dec'43.

The conventional contact exploder was designed for the earlier, slower, 33
knot, Mk 13 torpedo. The newer, faster, 46 knot, Mk 14 torpedo had higher
inertial impacts that would cause the firing pin to miss the exploder cap.


As a former Navy guy Vic, you're probably well aware that the above
explanations fit very well with how the USN runs things. It takes a very
large spanner to the head to get them to admit a problem, let alone fix it.

(As for God not liking American torpedo bombers - it's true that they had
very dismal success overall, and many pilots and planes were lost, but he
appeared to like the four Japanese aircraft carriers even less. Eventually
American planes were able to make decisive and deadly hits against the
Japanese carriers. One pilot, as noted before, spotted the all-important
destroyer wake that led him to the carrier groups. In another instance, a
pilot realized the entire group of fighters was attacking a single (the
closest) carrier so he broke off that attack and with another plane
accompanying him sought out the other IJN carriers and killed them.

I've heard the rear seat fliers (facing backwards) tell of the horrifying
minute or so where the pilot would dive on the Japanese ships and all they
could see were the Zeroes flying overhead as they plunged quickly downward
with the back seater facing against the direction of travel. I don't even
like to sit in train seats facing backwards . . ..

--
Bobby G.