On 10/19/2011 7:38 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
In ,
says...

On 10/19/2011 5:45 PM, Larry Blanchard wrote:
On Wed, 19 Oct 2011 17:59:11 -0400, Nova wrote:

The Supreme Court seems to think that individuals can decide to not
procreate, and the government can in certain circumstances decide for
individuals that they may not procreate.

Please provide an example.

See:

http://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-R-0183.htm

And *that* ought to settle *that*!

(but it won't)

Apparently that criminal penalty (castration of convicted sex offenders
as a criminal penalty) has been imposed so seldom that its
constitutionality has never been tested in the Supreme Court. Aside from
its obvious infringement on a person's right to procreate, it may well
be "cruel and unusual punishment" which the Constitution specifically
prohibits. And even if it was to be upheld, that does not show there is
no general right to make personal decisions about procreation, any more
than showing that a convicted felon can be imprisoned would show there
is no general right to liberty.

More than 60,000 people have been forcibly sterilized in the US. How
many does it take before the constitutionality of it is tested in the
Supreme Court to your satisfaction?


The subject here is whether procreation is a fundamental right.
Even Skinner v. Oklahoma recognized that it is: "We are dealing here
with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have
subtle, farreaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands
it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to
wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom the
law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his
irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty."


Do you need more?

San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973):
"Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a state law
permitting forced sterilization of ‘habitual criminals.’ Implicit in the
Court's opinion is the recognition that the right of procreation is
among the rights of personal privacy protected under the Constitution."


Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 762 (1997) (Souter, concurring):
"After Meyer and Pierce, two further opinions took the major steps that
lead to the modern law. The first was not even in a due process case but
one about equal protection, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942), where the Court
emphasized the “fundamental” nature of individual choice about
procreation and so foreshadowed not only the later prominence of
procreation as a subject of liberty protection, but the corresponding
standard of “strict scrutiny,” in this Court's Fourteenth Amendment law.
See id., at 541, 62 S.Ct., at 1113. Skinner, that is, added decisions
regarding procreation to the list of liberties recognized in Meyer and
Pierce and loosely suggested, as a gloss on their standard of
arbitrariness, a judicial obligation to scrutinize any impingement on
such an important interest with heightened care."


Carey v. Population Services, Intern., 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (a
longer quote than I gave before):
"Appellants argue that this Court has not accorded a “right of access to
contraceptives” the status of a fundamental aspect of personal liberty.
They emphasize that Griswold v. Connecticut, struck down a state
prohibition of the use of contraceptives, and so had no occasion to
discuss laws “regulating their manufacture or sale.” 381 U.S., at 485,
85 S.Ct., at 1682. Eisenstadt v. Baird, was decided under the Equal
Protection Clause, holding that “whatever the rights of the individual
to access to contraceptivesmay *687 be, the rights must be the same for
the unmarried and the married alike.” 405 U.S., at 453, 92 S.Ct., at
1038. Thus appellants argue that neither case should be treated as
reflecting upon the State's power to limit or prohibit distribution of
contraceptives to any persons, married or unmarried. But see id., at
463-464, 92 S.Ct., at 1043-1044 (White, J., concurring in result).
The fatal fallacy in this argument is that it overlooks the underlying
premise of those decisions that the Constitution protects “the right of
the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into . . . the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Id., at 453,
92 S.Ct., at 1038. Griswold did state that by “forbidding the use of
contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale,” the
Connecticut statute there had “a maximum destructive impact” on privacy
rights. 381 U.S., at 485, 85 S.Ct., at 1682. This intrusion into “the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms” made that statute particularly
“repulsive.” Id., at 485-486, 85 S.Ct., at 1682. But subsequent
decisions have made clear that the constitutional protection of
individual autonomy in matters of childbearing is not dependent on that
element. Eisenstadt v. Baird, holding that the protection is not limited
to married couples, characterized the protected right as the “decision
whether to bear or beget a child.” 405 U.S., at 453, 92 S.Ct., at 1038
(emphasis added). Similarly, Roe v. Wade, held that the Constitution
protects “a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”
410 U.S., at 153, 93 S.Ct., at 727 (emphasis added). See also Whalen v.
Roe, supra, 429 U.S., at 599-600, 97 S.Ct., at 876-877, and n. 26. These
decisions put Griswold in proper perspective. Griswold may no longer be
read as holding only that a State may not prohibit a married couple's
use of contraceptives. Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of
Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.
Restrictions on the distribution of contraceptives clearly burden the
freedom to make such decisions. A total prohibition against sale of
contraceptives, for example, would intrude *688 upon individual
decisions in matters of procreation and contraception as harshly as a
direct ban on their use."


Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974):
"This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by
the Due Process Clause *640 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010; Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510; Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070; Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042. See also Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645; Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655. As we noted in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, 31 L.Ed.2d
349, there is a right ‘to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.’
By acting to penalize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child,
overly restrictive maternity leave regulations can constitute a heavy
burden on the exercise of these protected freedoms. Because public
school maternity leave rules directly affect ‘one of the basic civil
rights of man,’ Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, 316 U.S., at 541, 62 S.Ct.,
at 1113, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that such rules must not needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously
impinge upon this vital area of a teacher's constitutional liberty.'"


U.S. v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973):
"The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home,
just as it protects other special privacy rights such as those of
marriage, procreation, motherhood, child rearing, and education. See
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-454, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, 31
L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817,
1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S.,
at 486, 85 S.Ct., at 1682; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166,
64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925)."