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#1
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html
At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. |
#2
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote:
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. |
#3
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote:
On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. BTW a number of pilots have said if you know how to turn off the MCAS (put in a little flap), you just land the plane and everyone makes their connection. |
#5
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
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#6
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 2:51:24 AM UTC-5, wrote:
On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. That's a good one two. And it's not really a software problem, it's a DESIGN problem. The programmers didn't make a mistake, the program does what they were told to make it do. If you bought a TV that didn't work, that you could not use because of a "software problem", would you say there was nothing wrong with the TV? It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. Totally wrong. There is ZERO evidence that I have seen, that this was a problem created by the programmers. The program did what it was designed to do. BTW a number of pilots have said if you know how to turn off the MCAS (put in a little flap), you just land the plane and everyone makes their connection. Not any responsible pilots that understand the problem. The pilots in the Ethiopian crash did exactly that. The co-pilots last words were that he could not trim the plane manually. Also, "put in a little flap" was NOT the procedure that Boeing told pilots to use to recover. And that was AFTER the first crash, after they had more than a week to think about it. And it surely was not the programmers that issued that directive either. |
#7
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 08:32:16 +0000, Bod wrote:
On 23/01/2020 07:50, wrote: On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. BTW a number of pilots have said if you know how to turn off the MCAS (put in a little flap), you just land the plane and everyone makes their connection. Now you sound like Trump who blames everyone else. Boing make the plane so the buck stops at Boing. Just trying to put the blame where it belongs. It wasn't the air frame that failed, just the software. I am sure that problem was fixed in a couple of days and now they have been picking that plane apart piece by piece for a year and when they finally say OK, it will be the safest plane in the air. In fact better pilots were not having the problem with it in the first place. It is no coincidence that the crashes were 3d world airlines and mediocre pilots with minimal flight hours compared to your average 1st world airline pilot. |
#8
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 07:20:19 -0800 (PST), trader_4
wrote: On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 2:51:24 AM UTC-5, wrote: On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. That's a good one two. And it's not really a software problem, it's a DESIGN problem. The programmers didn't make a mistake, the program does what they were told to make it do. If you bought a TV that didn't work, that you could not use because of a "software problem", would you say there was nothing wrong with the TV? It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. Totally wrong. There is ZERO evidence that I have seen, that this was a problem created by the programmers. The program did what it was designed to do. So I guess you have the specs the programmers were working with. Please give us a link so we can all see. Some programmer decided when MCAS was supposed to be operating how it was monitored. My bet, they just gave them broad parameters of what sensors were available and what actuators they had to use. They also decided to only use one AOA sensor when two were available and not to alert the pilot when they did not agree. The latter actually being the fatal flaw. My guess is the programmers don't know **** about airplanes, they just write video game type software and do not take into account dealing with hardware failures. As for my TV. If the Netflix function takes a **** and everything else works fine, I would blame the software, not the hardware. Maybe I just have more experience in this arena tho. BTW a number of pilots have said if you know how to turn off the MCAS (put in a little flap), you just land the plane and everyone makes their connection. Not any responsible pilots that understand the problem. The pilots in the Ethiopian crash did exactly that. The co-pilots last words were that he could not trim the plane manually. Also, "put in a little flap" was NOT the procedure that Boeing told pilots to use to recover. And that was AFTER the first crash, after they had more than a week to think about it. And it surely was not the programmers that issued that directive either. The pilot told the co-pilot to stfu too. He was too arrogant to save his own life. Maybe if the co-pilot was more than a recently graduated student the pilot would have paid more attention to him. |
#9
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 12:54:21 PM UTC-5, wrote:
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 08:32:16 +0000, Bod wrote: On 23/01/2020 07:50, wrote: On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. BTW a number of pilots have said if you know how to turn off the MCAS (put in a little flap), you just land the plane and everyone makes their connection. Now you sound like Trump who blames everyone else. Boing make the plane so the buck stops at Boing. Just trying to put the blame where it belongs. It wasn't the air frame that failed, just the software. Again, the software did not fail. The software performed as it was designed to perform. A software failure would be some programming error, some coding mistake, that caused the software to do something other than it was designed to do. I am sure that problem was fixed in a couple of days If it was fixed in a couple days, the second one would not have crashed six months later. and now they have been picking that plane apart piece by piece for a year and when they finally say OK, it will be the safest plane in the air. I would not count on that. In fact better pilots were not having the problem with it in the first place. It is no coincidence that the crashes were 3d world airlines and mediocre pilots with minimal flight hours compared to your average 1st world airline pilot. That's all wrong too. It was pure coincidence. This problem, the AOA sensor failing, only occurred with two planes on three flights on Lion Air and Ethiopia flights. It never happened to any other airline, nor is there any reason to believe the outcomes would have been any different. In fact, the second crash, the co-pilot with just 200 hours is the one that correctly followed the Boeing procedure that Boeing put out after the Lion Air crash to deal with the problem. His last words were that he could not move the trim wheel. |
#10
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 1:05:11 PM UTC-5, wrote:
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 07:20:19 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 2:51:24 AM UTC-5, wrote: On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. That's a good one two. And it's not really a software problem, it's a DESIGN problem. The programmers didn't make a mistake, the program does what they were told to make it do. If you bought a TV that didn't work, that you could not use because of a "software problem", would you say there was nothing wrong with the TV? It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. Totally wrong. There is ZERO evidence that I have seen, that this was a problem created by the programmers. The program did what it was designed to do. So I guess you have the specs the programmers were working with. Please give us a link so we can all see. If you followed this at all, it's been very clear that Boeing, FAA and all involved have made it clear that it was a DESIGN issue, not a coding problem, not a programmer's error. The programmers did not come up with MCAS, aeronautical engineers did. The programmers did not decide that it should rely on just one AOA sensor. The programmers did not decide how much trim authority the MCAS add-on should apply, in what increments, what max amount. They didn't decide what indicators should be in the cockpit and whether they should be standard equipment or a $10K extra option. And they didn't decide to increase the authority MCAS had after flight testing and to not inform the FAA that they had increased the amount of trim that MCAS could put on by a factor of three. Some programmer decided when MCAS was supposed to be operating how it was monitored. BS. Programmers don't make those decisions, aeronautical engineers, test pilots, system designers do. They create the system, describe how it's to operate, what the parameters are, then software writers code to it. My bet, they just gave them broad parameters of what sensors were available and what actuators they had to use. That's incredibly silly. Programmers writing code don't understand how the plane flies or what is or isn't required. They also decided to only use one AOA sensor when two were available and not to alert the pilot when they did not agree. IDK what your experience with what programmers do has been. In my experience, in the logical world, those decisions are made by engineers with experience in the actual underlying system, not programmers. They lay out what the system is, what elements it uses, what it has to control, how much authority it has, how it operates. The software coders then implement that. The FAA also checks the system and approves it. The latter actually being the fatal flaw. That's beyond silly too. Programmers don't decide what indicators or warning lights go into the cockpit. Aeronautical engineers and system designers determine that. And the planes had a AOA disagree light OPTION, if airlines wanted to pay for it. And no, the software writers didn't decide it should be a $10K option either. Boeing also knew a year before the crash, that even if an airline ordered that option, it did not work! That was the one and only error that is likely attributable to the software writers. But it's not the only error, someone failed again at system validation, making sure it actually worked. And Boeing management, not the programmers, decided to keep secret the fact that if you ordered the disagree light as an option, it did not work secret instead of alerting operators. They planned on fixing it one day with a software update. That date never came. There's also no evidence that a working disagree light would have made any difference, the pilots didn't even know MCAS was there, much less how it operated. My guess is the programmers don't know **** about airplanes, they just write video game type software and do not take into account dealing with hardware failures. Yet you think they decide what indicators go into the cockpit, what sensors are used, what authority over the aircraft systems have, etc. Go figure. As for my TV. If the Netflix function takes a **** and everything else works fine, I would blame the software, not the hardware. Maybe I just have more experience in this arena tho. Nice try at moving the goal posts. The issue wasn't whether it was hardware or software that was the problem with the Max. The issue was you stated there was nothing wrong with the airplane, only the software. So, again, if part of your TV doesn't work, if software can cause it to catch fire, burn down the house and kill people, would you say there is "nothing wrong with the TV"? BTW a number of pilots have said if you know how to turn off the MCAS (put in a little flap), you just land the plane and everyone makes their connection. Not any responsible pilots that understand the problem. The pilots in the Ethiopian crash did exactly that. The co-pilots last words were that he could not trim the plane manually. Also, "put in a little flap" was NOT the procedure that Boeing told pilots to use to recover. And that was AFTER the first crash, after they had more than a week to think about it. And it surely was not the programmers that issued that directive either. The pilot told the co-pilot to stfu too. He was too arrogant to save his own life. Cite for that please. Not that it has anything to do with the issue though. The simple fact is that the co-pilot of the Ethiopian crash correctly identified the problem and followed the exact procedure that Boeing put out after the Lion Air crash. It didn't work, because it was impossible to move the mechanical trim wheels. Which is a problem that Boeing has known about on all 737s since the 60s. In fact, they used to disclose that in the manuals and outline a procedure that involves putting the plane into a dive to relieve forces enough so that the wheel can be turned. Later they removed that from subsequent manuals and it disappeared. It wouldn't have mattered in the Ethiopian crahs, the plane did not have sufficient altitude. Maybe if the co-pilot was more than a recently graduated student the pilot would have paid more attention to him. ROFL Another good one, you're on a roll recently. Blame the co-pilot who had it correctly identified and did exactly what Boeing said to do. And it's BS, because the pilot didn't do anything to stop the co-pilot,just more Fretwell fiction. |
#11
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
trader_4 writes:
On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 1:05:11 PM UTC-5, wrote: On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 07:20:19 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: Totally wrong. There is ZERO evidence that I have seen, that this was a problem created by the programmers. The program did what it was designed to do. So I guess you have the specs the programmers were working with. Please give us a link so we can all see. If you followed this at all, it's been very clear that Boeing, FAA and all involved have made it clear that it was a DESIGN issue, not a coding problem, not a programmer's error. The primary factor here was the need for a more efficient engine in order to reach the per-pax-per-flight cost reduction targets. The 737 (design started in 1964) was specifically designed to use unimproved airfields (i.e. airstairs) so it was designed very close to the ground. This worked well with the engines of the day. The next generation (NG) models (-700, -800) used a larger fan diameter for efficiency, but needed to flatten the bottom of the cowl in order for the engine to fit under the wing. The MAX (-7, -8) needed an even larger fan (and bypass ratio) to achieve their fuel efficiency goals (the main reason a customer would buy a MAX over an NG), unfortunately, there was no room left under the wing and a redesign of the undercarriage would push the schedule out and raise the development cost. The engineers moved the engine forward on the pylon moving the fan ahead of the wing. This changed the 'pitch moment' of the airplane (moving the engine forward made it more likely that the engine would cause the airplane to pitch up (nose up)). To ameliorate the unsafe pitch moment they implemented the MCAS subsystem, which will force the pitch back down under certain conditions (and of course, the mechanism wasn't designed with appropriate fail-safe; only one of the two angle of attack (aoa) sensors was used by the MCAS system. Note that this design was a direct result of the refusal of management to do the right thing and either redesign the undercarriage and associated structural elements (which would mean they'd need a new production line for MAX instead of sharing with -NG) or do a clean-sheet design to replace the 737 (which is what they should have done, but they had a lot of pressure from the A321LR at the high-end of the NG product range and the MAX -8 was intended to be the short term competition for the A321LR until the NMA (New Midmarket Aircraft - a replacement for the 757) hit the market (it's been delayed yet again, as has the 777X). Granted, there was incompetence all the way up and down the chain. |
#12
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 2:31:12 PM UTC-5, Scott Lurndal wrote:
trader_4 writes: On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 1:05:11 PM UTC-5, wrote: On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 07:20:19 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: Totally wrong. There is ZERO evidence that I have seen, that this was a problem created by the programmers. The program did what it was designed to do. So I guess you have the specs the programmers were working with. Please give us a link so we can all see. If you followed this at all, it's been very clear that Boeing, FAA and all involved have made it clear that it was a DESIGN issue, not a coding problem, not a programmer's error. The primary factor here was the need for a more efficient engine in order to reach the per-pax-per-flight cost reduction targets. The 737 (design started in 1964) was specifically designed to use unimproved airfields (i.e. airstairs) so it was designed very close to the ground. This worked well with the engines of the day. The next generation (NG) models (-700, -800) used a larger fan diameter for efficiency, but needed to flatten the bottom of the cowl in order for the engine to fit under the wing. The MAX (-7, -8) needed an even larger fan (and bypass ratio) to achieve their fuel efficiency goals (the main reason a customer would buy a MAX over an NG), unfortunately, there was no room left under the wing and a redesign of the undercarriage would push the schedule out and raise the development cost. The engineers moved the engine forward on the pylon moving the fan ahead of the wing. This changed the 'pitch moment' of the airplane (moving the engine forward made it more likely that the engine would cause the airplane to pitch up (nose up)). To ameliorate the unsafe pitch moment they implemented the MCAS subsystem, which will force the pitch back down under certain conditions (and of course, the mechanism wasn't designed with appropriate fail-safe; only one of the two angle of attack (aoa) sensors was used by the MCAS system. Note that this design was a direct result of the refusal of management to do the right thing and either redesign the undercarriage and associated structural elements (which would mean they'd need a new production line for MAX instead of sharing with -NG) or do a clean-sheet design to replace the 737 (which is what they should have done, but they had a lot of pressure from the A321LR at the high-end of the NG product range and the MAX -8 was intended to be the short term competition for the A321LR until the NMA (New Midmarket Aircraft - a replacement for the 757) hit the market (it's been delayed yet again, as has the 777X). Granted, there was incompetence all the way up and down the chain. I think what you're saying there is that you agree it was not a programming error, a coding error, that the software did what it was designed to do, it implemented MCAS as the aeronautical folks designed it to operate. |
#13
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On 1/23/2020 12:53 PM, wrote:
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 08:32:16 +0000, Bod wrote: On 23/01/2020 07:50, wrote: On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. BTW a number of pilots have said if you know how to turn off the MCAS (put in a little flap), you just land the plane and everyone makes their connection. Now you sound like Trump who blames everyone else. Boing make the plane so the buck stops at Boing. Just trying to put the blame where it belongs. It wasn't the air frame that failed, just the software. I am sure that problem was fixed in a couple of days and now they have been picking that plane apart piece by piece for a year and when they finally say OK, it will be the safest plane in the air. In fact better pilots were not having the problem with it in the first place. It is no coincidence that the crashes were 3d world airlines and mediocre pilots with minimal flight hours compared to your average 1st world airline pilot. For those that care, Boeing, not Boing. Air frame is a factor as they had to move the engines and change the balance. Software is compensating for physical characteristics of flight. Seems that some shortcuts were taken in pilot training also. Overall it has become a ****show with some push back from flight attendants that may refuse to fly on it. |
#14
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 10:25:57 -0800 (PST), trader_4
wrote: On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 12:54:21 PM UTC-5, wrote: On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 08:32:16 +0000, Bod wrote: On 23/01/2020 07:50, wrote: On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. BTW a number of pilots have said if you know how to turn off the MCAS (put in a little flap), you just land the plane and everyone makes their connection. Now you sound like Trump who blames everyone else. Boing make the plane so the buck stops at Boing. Just trying to put the blame where it belongs. It wasn't the air frame that failed, just the software. Again, the software did not fail. The software performed as it was designed to perform. A software failure would be some programming error, some coding mistake, that caused the software to do something other than it was designed to do. I am sure that problem was fixed in a couple of days If it was fixed in a couple days, the second one would not have crashed six months later. and now they have been picking that plane apart piece by piece for a year and when they finally say OK, it will be the safest plane in the air. I would not count on that. In fact better pilots were not having the problem with it in the first place. It is no coincidence that the crashes were 3d world airlines and mediocre pilots with minimal flight hours compared to your average 1st world airline pilot. That's all wrong too. It was pure coincidence. This problem, the AOA sensor failing, only occurred with two planes on three flights on Lion Air and Ethiopia flights. It never happened to any other airline, nor is there any reason to believe the outcomes would have been any different. In fact, the second crash, the co-pilot with just 200 hours is the one that correctly followed the Boeing procedure that Boeing put out after the Lion Air crash to deal with the problem. His last words were that he could not move the trim wheel. Maybe you should read a little more about this OUT |
#15
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 02:50:57 -0500, wrote:
On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. BTW a number of pilots have said if you know how to turn off the MCAS (put in a little flap), you just land the plane and everyone makes their connection. It's the bean counters that made the second detector optional and put kids in sneakers in charge of critical software. It's bean counters that pushed the decision to not require ransitional training from the 727 to the MAX. It was, to a large extent, beancounters that drove the design to the point MCAS was required in the first place. |
#16
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:04:43 -0500, wrote:
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 07:20:19 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 2:51:24 AM UTC-5, wrote: On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. That's a good one two. And it's not really a software problem, it's a DESIGN problem. The programmers didn't make a mistake, the program does what they were told to make it do. If you bought a TV that didn't work, that you could not use because of a "software problem", would you say there was nothing wrong with the TV? It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. Totally wrong. There is ZERO evidence that I have seen, that this was a problem created by the programmers. The program did what it was designed to do. So I guess you have the specs the programmers were working with. Please give us a link so we can all see. Some programmer decided when MCAS was supposed to be operating how it was monitored. My bet, they just gave them broad parameters of what sensors were available and what actuators they had to use. They also decided to only use one AOA sensor when two were available and not to alert the pilot when they did not agree. The latter actually being the fatal flaw. My guess is the programmers don't know **** about airplanes, they just write video game type software and do not take into account dealing with hardware failures. If the beanies said "we need to cut the base price, so only put in one AOA sensor - make a second one an extra cost option" the code kiddies design around that parameter. Can't blame the code kiddies for that. The engineers have to have the balls to stand up to the engineers for a change and say "not on my watch - cut corners somewhere else - redundancy is not on he table". As for my TV. If the Netflix function takes a **** and everything else works fine, I would blame the software, not the hardware. Maybe I just have more experience in this arena tho. BTW a number of pilots have said if you know how to turn off the MCAS (put in a little flap), you just land the plane and everyone makes their connection. Not any responsible pilots that understand the problem. The pilots in the Ethiopian crash did exactly that. The co-pilots last words were that he could not trim the plane manually. Also, "put in a little flap" was NOT the procedure that Boeing told pilots to use to recover. And that was AFTER the first crash, after they had more than a week to think about it. And it surely was not the programmers that issued that directive either. The pilot told the co-pilot to stfu too. He was too arrogant to save his own life. Maybe if the co-pilot was more than a recently graduated student the pilot would have paid more attention to him. |
#17
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 20:35:54 -0500, Clare Snyder
wrote: On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:04:43 -0500, wrote: On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 07:20:19 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 2:51:24 AM UTC-5, wrote: On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. That's a good one two. And it's not really a software problem, it's a DESIGN problem. The programmers didn't make a mistake, the program does what they were told to make it do. If you bought a TV that didn't work, that you could not use because of a "software problem", would you say there was nothing wrong with the TV? It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. Totally wrong. There is ZERO evidence that I have seen, that this was a problem created by the programmers. The program did what it was designed to do. So I guess you have the specs the programmers were working with. Please give us a link so we can all see. Some programmer decided when MCAS was supposed to be operating how it was monitored. My bet, they just gave them broad parameters of what sensors were available and what actuators they had to use. They also decided to only use one AOA sensor when two were available and not to alert the pilot when they did not agree. The latter actually being the fatal flaw. My guess is the programmers don't know **** about airplanes, they just write video game type software and do not take into account dealing with hardware failures. If the beanies said "we need to cut the base price, so only put in one AOA sensor - make a second one an extra cost option" the code kiddies design around that parameter. Can't blame the code kiddies for that. Both sensors are there. I doubt some suit in Seattle was involved at that level. It was just a few more lines of code to compare the sensors and turn on a light if they disagreed. In fact that was an option. Those 3d world suits decided not to buy it. I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. The engineers have to have the balls to stand up to the engineers for a change and say "not on my watch - cut corners somewhere else - redundancy is not on he table". That may be true but we don't know what really happened and Boeing isn't talking. It is clear from the leaks that there were engineers who were monday morning quarter backing tho. |
#18
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On 01/23/2020 02:00 PM, Ed Pawlowski wrote:
For those that care, Boeing, not Boing. Boing Boing never crashed a plane, afaik. https://boingboing.net/ But then they never tried to build a plane. |
#19
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 7:49:23 PM UTC-5, wrote:
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 10:25:57 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 12:54:21 PM UTC-5, wrote: On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 08:32:16 +0000, Bod wrote: On 23/01/2020 07:50, wrote: On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. BTW a number of pilots have said if you know how to turn off the MCAS (put in a little flap), you just land the plane and everyone makes their connection. Now you sound like Trump who blames everyone else. Boing make the plane so the buck stops at Boing. Just trying to put the blame where it belongs. It wasn't the air frame that failed, just the software. Again, the software did not fail. The software performed as it was designed to perform. A software failure would be some programming error, some coding mistake, that caused the software to do something other than it was designed to do. I am sure that problem was fixed in a couple of days If it was fixed in a couple days, the second one would not have crashed six months later. and now they have been picking that plane apart piece by piece for a year and when they finally say OK, it will be the safest plane in the air. I would not count on that. In fact better pilots were not having the problem with it in the first place. It is no coincidence that the crashes were 3d world airlines and mediocre pilots with minimal flight hours compared to your average 1st world airline pilot. That's all wrong too. It was pure coincidence. This problem, the AOA sensor failing, only occurred with two planes on three flights on Lion Air and Ethiopia flights. It never happened to any other airline, nor is there any reason to believe the outcomes would have been any different. In fact, the second crash, the co-pilot with just 200 hours is the one that correctly followed the Boeing procedure that Boeing put out after the Lion Air crash to deal with the problem. His last words were that he could not move the trim wheel. Maybe you should read a little more about this OUT Good one. When you have a link to anything that shows anything I have stated here is incorrect, let me know. |
#20
Posted to alt.home.repair
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 10:58:52 PM UTC-5, wrote:
On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 20:35:54 -0500, Clare Snyder wrote: On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:04:43 -0500, wrote: On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 07:20:19 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 2:51:24 AM UTC-5, wrote: On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. That's a good one two. And it's not really a software problem, it's a DESIGN problem. The programmers didn't make a mistake, the program does what they were told to make it do. If you bought a TV that didn't work, that you could not use because of a "software problem", would you say there was nothing wrong with the TV? It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. Totally wrong. There is ZERO evidence that I have seen, that this was a problem created by the programmers. The program did what it was designed to do. So I guess you have the specs the programmers were working with. Please give us a link so we can all see. Some programmer decided when MCAS was supposed to be operating how it was monitored. My bet, they just gave them broad parameters of what sensors were available and what actuators they had to use. They also decided to only use one AOA sensor when two were available and not to alert the pilot when they did not agree. The latter actually being the fatal flaw. My guess is the programmers don't know **** about airplanes, they just write video game type software and do not take into account dealing with hardware failures. If the beanies said "we need to cut the base price, so only put in one AOA sensor - make a second one an extra cost option" the code kiddies design around that parameter. Can't blame the code kiddies for that. Both sensors are there. I doubt some suit in Seattle was involved at that level. It was just a few more lines of code to compare the sensors and turn on a light if they disagreed. In fact that was an option. Those 3d world suits decided not to buy it. Correct, but there is no reason to believe having the disagree light would have made any difference. Remember, there was no explanation of what MCAS was, how it works in the aircraft manuals. The only mention of it that could be found was in the glossary of terms, where MCAS was listed. I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair. The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. We don't know that the outcome would have been any different if it had happened to SW or American. We do know that the Ethiopian airline crew followed the exact procedure that Boeing recommended after the Lion Air crash and that it did not work. The co-pilots last words were that he was unable to move the trim wheel by hand. Those are the facts, not speculation. Boeing even screwed up the procedure to recover that they put in place after the first crash. There is obviously a whole lot of incompetence at Boeing. But Boeing has gotten something right, at least so far, the new 777-X made it's first flight a few hours ago. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z4t7L6p2Rug |
#21
Posted to alt.home.repair
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On 1/25/2020 2:17 PM, trader_4 wrote:
On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 10:58:52 PM UTC-5, wrote: On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 20:35:54 -0500, Clare Snyder wrote: On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:04:43 -0500, wrote: On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 07:20:19 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: On Thursday, January 23, 2020 at 2:51:24 AM UTC-5, wrote: On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 18:56:03 -0800, Bob F wrote: On 1/22/2020 9:10 AM, Guilaumme Faury wrote: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trum...sis-grows.html At one time, Boeing knew how to build airplanes. When engineers ran the company - before the bean counters took over. Capitalism at it's best today. There is nothing wrong with the plane, they have a software problem. That's a good one two. And it's not really a software problem, it's a DESIGN problem. The programmers didn't make a mistake, the program does what they were told to make it do. If you bought a TV that didn't work, that you could not use because of a "software problem", would you say there was nothing wrong with the TV? It isn't the bean counters, it is those kids in sneakers who are writing the bugware. Totally wrong. There is ZERO evidence that I have seen, that this was a problem created by the programmers. The program did what it was designed to do. So I guess you have the specs the programmers were working with. Please give us a link so we can all see. Some programmer decided when MCAS was supposed to be operating how it was monitored. My bet, they just gave them broad parameters of what sensors were available and what actuators they had to use. They also decided to only use one AOA sensor when two were available and not to alert the pilot when they did not agree. The latter actually being the fatal flaw. My guess is the programmers don't know **** about airplanes, they just write video game type software and do not take into account dealing with hardware failures. If the beanies said "we need to cut the base price, so only put in one AOA sensor - make a second one an extra cost option" the code kiddies design around that parameter. Can't blame the code kiddies for that. Both sensors are there. I doubt some suit in Seattle was involved at that level. It was just a few more lines of code to compare the sensors and turn on a light if they disagreed. In fact that was an option. Those 3d world suits decided not to buy it. Correct, but there is no reason to believe having the disagree light would have made any difference. Remember, there was no explanation of what MCAS was, how it works in the aircraft manuals. The only mention of it that could be found was in the glossary of terms, where MCAS was listed. I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair. The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. We don't know that the outcome would have been any different if it had happened to SW or American. We do know that the Ethiopian airline crew followed the exact procedure that Boeing recommended after the Lion Air crash and that it did not work. The co-pilots last words were that he was unable to move the trim wheel by hand. Those are the facts, not speculation. Boeing even screwed up the procedure to recover that they put in place after the first crash. There is obviously a whole lot of incompetence at Boeing. But Boeing has gotten something right, at least so far, the new 777-X made it's first flight a few hours ago. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z4t7L6p2Rug Looks nice, I hope they do better than the Max. I've only ever piloted single engine stuff, would love to just take off, circle and land one of those. There is a place not too far from me where I could get simulator time. |
#22
Posted to alt.home.repair
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 11:17:36 -0800 (PST), trader_4
wrote: I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair. The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. That is certainly what lead to two crashes but I haven't really heard anyone say those were the only two AOA sensor failures. |
#23
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
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#24
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
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#25
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Sun, 26 Jan 2020 18:40:08 -0700, rbowman
wrote: On 01/26/2020 02:11 PM, wrote: On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 11:17:36 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair. The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. That is certainly what lead to two crashes but I haven't really heard anyone say those were the only two AOA sensor failures. I had the impression there were other failures but for competent pilots it was just another day on the job. I'll bet it scared the heck out of even the "competent" ones when it first happened - - - |
#26
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On 01/26/2020 07:21 PM, Clare Snyder wrote:
On Sun, 26 Jan 2020 18:40:08 -0700, rbowman wrote: On 01/26/2020 02:11 PM, wrote: On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 11:17:36 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair. The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. That is certainly what lead to two crashes but I haven't really heard anyone say those were the only two AOA sensor failures. I had the impression there were other failures but for competent pilots it was just another day on the job. I'll bet it scared the heck out of even the "competent" ones when it first happened - - - There's that old saw something about hours of boredom with the odd seconds of terror. I used to fly in the '80s but the boredom got to me and in my heart of hearts I didn't think i was capable of doing the right thing in the seconds of terror. |
#27
Posted to alt.home.repair
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Sun, 26 Jan 2020 21:21:33 -0500, Clare Snyder
wrote: On Sun, 26 Jan 2020 18:40:08 -0700, rbowman wrote: On 01/26/2020 02:11 PM, wrote: On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 11:17:36 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair. The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. That is certainly what lead to two crashes but I haven't really heard anyone say those were the only two AOA sensor failures. I had the impression there were other failures but for competent pilots it was just another day on the job. I'll bet it scared the heck out of even the "competent" ones when it first happened - - - The story I heard on Avweb was the guy had actually read up on MCAS and he just added some flap and landed normally. |
#28
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On 1/27/2020 12:36 AM, rbowman wrote:
On 01/26/2020 07:21 PM, Clare Snyder wrote: On Sun, 26 Jan 2020 18:40:08 -0700, rbowman wrote: On 01/26/2020 02:11 PM, wrote: On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 11:17:36 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair.* The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. That is certainly what lead to two crashes but I haven't really heard anyone say those were the only two AOA sensor failures. I had the impression there were other failures but for competent pilots it was just another day on the job. I'll bet it scared the heck out of even the "competent" ones when it first happened - - - There's that old saw something about hours of boredom with the odd seconds of terror. I used to fly in the '80s but the boredom got to me and in my heart of hearts I didn't think i was capable of doing the right thing in the seconds of terror. Flying is easy until **** starts breaking. |
#29
Posted to alt.home.repair
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Sunday, January 26, 2020 at 4:12:14 PM UTC-5, wrote:
On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 11:17:36 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair. The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. That is certainly what lead to two crashes but I haven't really heard anyone say those were the only two AOA sensor failures. I've seen a list of incidents US pilots reported on Maxs, nothing there about any AOA sensor failures. Since it produces at minimum a very bizarre and scary ride for the passengers, one would think it would likely be on the news soon as it happened. But then you're the one alleging it was due to foreign pilots, so you show us where it's happened with US or similar airlines and that they managed to figure it out. Also, we've heard nothing about the root cause of why these new sensors failed, which is odd. I assume they are not used in other planes? If they are, that's shocking, because you'd think they would have figured out what was wrong, what needs to be immediately checked or replaced on any other planes that use them. |
#30
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Sunday, January 26, 2020 at 9:21:36 PM UTC-5, Clare Snyder wrote:
On Sun, 26 Jan 2020 18:40:08 -0700, rbowman wrote: On 01/26/2020 02:11 PM, wrote: On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 11:17:36 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair. The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. That is certainly what lead to two crashes but I haven't really heard anyone say those were the only two AOA sensor failures. I had the impression there were other failures but for competent pilots it was just another day on the job. I'll bet it scared the heck out of even the "competent" ones when it first happened - - - It didn't happen on any other flights, there were just three flights. How many AOA sensors would fail in a few hundred planes that are just a year old? |
#31
Posted to alt.home.repair
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
trader_4 writes:
But Boeing has gotten something right, at least so far, the new 777-X made it's first flight a few hours ago. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z4t7L6p2Rug Albeit four years late. |
#32
Posted to alt.home.repair
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Mon, 27 Jan 2020 06:40:29 -0800 (PST), trader_4
wrote: On Sunday, January 26, 2020 at 9:21:36 PM UTC-5, Clare Snyder wrote: On Sun, 26 Jan 2020 18:40:08 -0700, rbowman wrote: On 01/26/2020 02:11 PM, wrote: On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 11:17:36 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair. The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. That is certainly what lead to two crashes but I haven't really heard anyone say those were the only two AOA sensor failures. I had the impression there were other failures but for competent pilots it was just another day on the job. I'll bet it scared the heck out of even the "competent" ones when it first happened - - - It didn't happen on any other flights, there were just three flights. How many AOA sensors would fail in a few hundred planes that are just a year old? I would expect it would show up with the airline that has the most maxes and flies the most miles in them, not two in some obscure airline in the 3d world with very little flight experience in them. .... unless this is some kind of maintenance issue that they have been slow to point out. It is also possible that a good pilot would have caught the failure early, mitigated the problem and continued on his way without scaring the hell out of the passengers. Maybe they just spent the extra few bucks and bought the light that indicated the AOA failure. |
#33
Posted to alt.home.repair
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Mon, 27 Jan 2020 07:14:43 -0500, A noiseless patient Spider
wrote: On 1/27/2020 12:36 AM, rbowman wrote: On 01/26/2020 07:21 PM, Clare Snyder wrote: On Sun, 26 Jan 2020 18:40:08 -0700, rbowman wrote: On 01/26/2020 02:11 PM, wrote: On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 11:17:36 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair.* The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. That is certainly what lead to two crashes but I haven't really heard anyone say those were the only two AOA sensor failures. I had the impression there were other failures but for competent pilots it was just another day on the job. I'll bet it scared the heck out of even the "competent" ones when it first happened - - - There's that old saw something about hours of boredom with the odd seconds of terror. I used to fly in the '80s but the boredom got to me and in my heart of hearts I didn't think i was capable of doing the right thing in the seconds of terror. Flying is easy until **** starts breaking. Like the old saying - the prop is just a fan to keep the pilot cool. Just watch him start to sweat when the prop stops - - - - |
#34
Posted to alt.home.repair
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Mon, 27 Jan 2020 11:04:11 -0500, wrote:
On Mon, 27 Jan 2020 06:40:29 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: On Sunday, January 26, 2020 at 9:21:36 PM UTC-5, Clare Snyder wrote: On Sun, 26 Jan 2020 18:40:08 -0700, rbowman wrote: On 01/26/2020 02:11 PM, wrote: On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 11:17:36 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair. The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. That is certainly what lead to two crashes but I haven't really heard anyone say those were the only two AOA sensor failures. I had the impression there were other failures but for competent pilots it was just another day on the job. I'll bet it scared the heck out of even the "competent" ones when it first happened - - - It didn't happen on any other flights, there were just three flights. How many AOA sensors would fail in a few hundred planes that are just a year old? I would expect it would show up with the airline that has the most maxes and flies the most miles in them, not two in some obscure airline in the 3d world with very little flight experience in them. ... unless this is some kind of maintenance issue that they have been slow to point out. It is also possible that a good pilot would have caught the failure early, mitigated the problem and continued on his way without scaring the hell out of the passengers. Maybe they just spent the extra few bucks and bought the light that indicated the AOA failure. Apparently one of the subject planes had been washed - and at high altitudes the AOA froze |
#35
Posted to alt.home.repair
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Boing boing boing into the ground.
On Monday, January 27, 2020 at 11:04:54 AM UTC-5, wrote:
On Mon, 27 Jan 2020 06:40:29 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: On Sunday, January 26, 2020 at 9:21:36 PM UTC-5, Clare Snyder wrote: On Sun, 26 Jan 2020 18:40:08 -0700, rbowman wrote: On 01/26/2020 02:11 PM, wrote: On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 11:17:36 -0800 (PST), trader_4 wrote: I agree the training was lacking but it seems the 3d world airlines had all the trouble, in spite of flying the max a fraction of what airlines like Southwest were flying. Which again is totally unfair. The AOA sensors only failed on two aircraft, LionAir and Ethiopian Air. That is certainly what lead to two crashes but I haven't really heard anyone say those were the only two AOA sensor failures. I had the impression there were other failures but for competent pilots it was just another day on the job. I'll bet it scared the heck out of even the "competent" ones when it first happened - - - It didn't happen on any other flights, there were just three flights. How many AOA sensors would fail in a few hundred planes that are just a year old? I would expect it would show up with the airline that has the most maxes and flies the most miles in them, not two in some obscure airline in the 3d world with very little flight experience in them. Trumpesque style America first and only America, screw everyone else. All airlines didn't have a lot of experience with the Max, it had only gone into production about a year before the crash and only a few hundred had been delivered. Apparently Lion Air is not obscure to Boeing: Lion's Sha Lion Air Orders 201 737 MAXs and 29 Next-Generation 737-900s With leonine boldness, Lion Air has pounced on the opportunity to extend its 737 dominance far into the future. The worlds largest 737-900ER operator recently finalized a record-breaking order for the 737 MAX. Lion Air is also now the global launch customer for the 737 MAX 9. The firm order includes 201 737 MAXs and 29 Next-Generation 737-900s, the largest ever commercial airplane order for Boeing. Lion Air was the first airline in Asia to commit to the 737 MAX. With the finalized MAX order, MAX success is sure to follow. Hakuna matata! ... unless this is some kind of maintenance issue that they have been slow to point out. Hard to imagine it's a maintenance issue on a plane that's only a couple months old and the issue is a simple vane sensor. It is also possible that a good pilot would have caught the failure early, mitigated the problem and continued on his way without scaring the hell out of the passengers. Maybe they just spent the extra few bucks and bought the light that indicated the AOA failure. Again, any such incidents are not just ignored and not documented. They would have been logged and reported. Even if a plane had the AOA disagree light, there is no indication it would have made a difference. Again, there was no explanation of MCAS in the Max manuals, no pilots were aware of it or trained on it. They didn't know an AOA sensor could shove the nose down, no way of knowing how an AOA light would have factored in to what they might or might not do. And again, the Ethiopian crew followed the exact procedure that Boeing put out AFTER the first crash. It didn't work, the co-pilot was unable to move the trim wheel. Are pilots flying for American carriers stronger? |
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